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Abstract 
In the first chapter, we assess the effect of changes of government ownership on corporate 
innovation activities. Across 58 non-US countries, treatment firms’ innovation, both in 
quantity and quality, decrease after a governmental acquisition by using a difference-in-
difference regressions and propensity score matching. We show that there is conflict of interest 
between major shareholders and minor shareholders. The corporate innovation efficiency also 
decline after the government acquisition. We find that this negative relationship is more severe 
for the group with higher government ownership of banks, better creditor rights and worse 
stock market development. 
For second chapter, if the optimal capital structure exists, an overleveraged firm is expected to 
move towards the target structure by taking actions that would lower the leverage. Many 
previous studies, however, show that leverage-decreasing transactions, including offering 
stocks in exchange of bonds, are meted out with negative market reactions, suggesting 
deficiencies of the trade-off theory in explaining this phenomenon. In this paper we 
hypothesize and show that the negative market reactions might be attributed to incorrect 
rebalancing by poorly-governed firms in the under-leverage domain, who instead of increasing 
leverage are purposely engaged in leverage-reducing activities. 
 
Keywords:  Government Ownership; Government Acquisition; Corporate Innovation; 
Innovation Efficiency; Capital Structure; Exchange Offer; Equity-for-Debt; Speed of 
Adjustment; Peking Order Theory; Trade-off Theory; Corporate Governance;
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Chapter 1 
Government Ownership and Corporate Innovation: International Evidence 
1. Introduction 
The effects of various ownership structures on firm performance and manager 
behaviors have been widely studies in finance and economics literatures. Most importantly, the 
debate over government control or government ownership, the process of government to exist 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), has been ongoing by many economic researchers. On one 
aspect of argument, Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al 
(2009) Borisova et al (2013) stress the benefit of privatization and document that companies 
usually experience substantial improvement over different aspects of corporate mechanisms 
such as better profitability, better efficiency, or lower cost of funding. Those evidences suggest 
that states should reduce their holding in companies rather than increasing them. On the other 
hand, another string of literatures, from Borisova and Megginson (2011), Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell (2006) and Brown and Dinc (2011), argue the influences of government purchase 
target on socially-desirable objectives such as maintaining employment or achieving political 
goals. From existing literature, government control or government ownership significantly alter 
firm risk taking behavior since it will change the corporate mechanism. In the meanwhile, 
corporate innovation activities are highly related to firm risk tolerance since innovation project 
are usually risky. Changing of government ownership would alter concern of risk-taking 
behaviors which ultimately would change the corporate innovation activity. Our paper 
investigate this research question along with firm characteristics and a sample of public and 
private companies from 67 countries during 1990-2007 since the research of effect of 
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government ownership on corporate innovations is still sparse (Fang et al 2015, Xiao and Zhao 
2012, Tan et al 2015). 
Does government’s acquisition or withdrawal from a firm encourage or impede 
corporate innovation? Companies with public shareholders generally target wealth 
maximization, in terms of maximizing shareholders wealth. However, government control 
usually have different concern rather than maximizing shareholders value. Governments can 
purchase equity to maintain socially-desirable targets, such as maintaining certain levels of 
employment, or to subsidize industries considered vital to the nation’s political goals (Borisova 
and Megginson, 2013). Accordingly, investors come to expect that governments will prevent 
risky government-owned firms from bankruptcy, thus providing a guarantee of debt repayment 
(Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Brown and Dinç, 2011; Borisova and Megginson, 
2011). Lower risk of default might change companies risk taking behavior, thus further 
encourage companies to invest more in the innovation which require high risk tolerance. 
On the other hand, there are also negative influences from government control. For 
example, Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park (1993) warn that extra protection for companies 
from government can increase agency problem such as managerial moral hazard, and as a 
consequence of better protection, government owned companies exhibit poor performance low 
efficiency and government and taxpayers share the costs of insolvency. These inefficacy will 
possibly increase the cost of borrowing (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011) and is further 
enhanced by low CEO entrenchment, as government-owned firms are less likely to go 
bankrupt. The moral hazard problem will potential decrease the employee’s productivity since 
they are more likely to shirk. On the other hand, companies are not allowed to fire those 
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employee even at such low level of productivity Furthermore, because of socially-desirable 
target such as maintaining employment, employee are better protected after the government 
acquisition. Managers are more likely to shirk and more difficult to tie the incentives with 
shareholders. (Bradley, Kim and Tian, 2015). Bad monitoring from government might also 
increase underinvestment problem since managers would enjoy more cash on hands (Jansen, 
1986), which might lower the investment of innovation or lead to many bad investments or 
projects. 
Our empirical results show that corporate innovation activities significantly decrease in 
treatment group after the government acquisition no matter what innovation proxies are used. 
The magnitude of this decline is statistically and economically nontrivial. Our further 
investigation show that there is existing a conflict of interest between major shareholders and 
minor shareholders once the government ownership is over 50 percent of total stake of a firm. 
The conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders leads to lower efficiency of 
innovation, therefore contribute to the decline in innovation output.  
Our paper at least contribute two strands of current literatures about government 
ownership and corporate innovations. First of all, our paper provides the empirical evidence 
that government ownership is another factor that matters for corporate innovation in the 
existing literatures. We show that government ownership would change the risk-taking 
behavior of companies which therefore would further affect the motivation of companies to 
engage in risky innovative projects. The government purchase not only would affect the 
innovation output, but also would impede the innovation efficiency and inventor’s 
productivity. Our paper is complementary to existing literatures that are looking for 
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characteristics that alter the companies’ risk tolerance. For example, institutional ownership 
(Aghion et al 2013), private equity (Lerner et al 2011), stock liquidity (Fang et al 2014), 
financial analyst coverage (He and Tian 2013), labor unions (Bradley et al 2015), employment 
protection (Francis et al 2015), CEO characteristics (Hirshleifer et al 2012), firm boundaries 
(Seru 2014). 
Secondly, our paper contributes to the controversial about benefit and cost of 
privatization or nationalization. Subramanian and Megginson (2011) shows that privatization is 
negatively associated with strictness of labor protections. Megginson, Nash and Van 
Randenborgh (1994) find evidence that after privatization, companies reduce their debt ratios 
and increase their capital spending, consistent with enhanced market discipline. Our paper is 
consistent with those finding that government ownership would negatively affect firm 
performance in aspect of discouraging innovations (Tan, Tian, Zhang and Zhao, 2015). Social 
desirable targets are achieving in expense of hurting motivations of innovative activities. 
The rest of paper proceed as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 provides the data description. Section 4 provides the 
methodology and empirical evidences. Section 5 discuss the potential channel of how 
government control would affect innovation activity. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
The literature about innovation has been rapidly growing for the past decade. The 
corporate innovation research could be started from Aghion and Tirole (1994), who analyzes 
the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides 
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theoretical foundations of corporate innovation. For example, how the property rights affect 
corporate innovation activities; the financing process for innovation and endogeneity of 
organization of R&D. Furthermore, Aghion et al (2005) investigates the relationship between 
product market competition and innovation. They find strong evidence of an inverted-U 
relationship using panel data and develop a model where competition would impede 
innovation.  
Mostly importantly, Manso (2011) shows that to motivate innovation, companies 
should have optimal contract of employees that are emphasized long-term success and 
tolerance of short-term failure. Following Manso’s spirit, Tian and Wang (2014)’s story is 
based on a sample of venture capital (VC)-backed IPO firms, they examine whether tolerance 
for failure spurs corporate innovation. They find that IPO firms backed by more failure-tolerant 
VC investors are significantly promoting more innovative. On the other hand, Ferreira et al 
(2012) model the impact of public and private ownership structures on firm’s incentives to 
invest in innovative projects. They show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing 
ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. They show public ownership would 
create incentives for conventional projects rather than innovative projects. 
Other empirical evidences also show that various characteristics would affect the 
incentives of companies to invest in innovative projects. For example, institutional ownership 
(Aghion et al 2013), private equity (Lerner et al 2011), stock liquidity (Fang et al 2014), 
financial analyst coverage (He and Tian 2013), labor unions (Bradley et al 2014), employment 
protection (Francis et al 2015), CEO characteristics (Hirshleifer et al 2012), firm boundaries 
(Seru 2014), credit supply (Amore et al 2013), financial development (Hsu et al 2014), 
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takeover provisions (Atanassov 2013 and Xuan and Chemmanir 2013) and bank competitions 
(Chava et al 2013 and Cornaggia et al 2015).  
The literature on government ownership could be split into two arguments. One string 
of literatures, from Borisova and Megginson (2011), Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) 
and Brown and Dinc (2011), argue the influences of government purchase target on socially-
desirable objectives such as maintaining employment or achieving political goals. Thus 
government ownership would bring some benefit for the companies such as lower cost of 
borrowing or lower risk of bankruptcy. On the other hand, Megginson and Netter (2001), 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al (2009) Borisova et al (2013) stress the benefit of 
privatization and document that companies usually experience substantial improvement over 
different aspects of corporate mechanisms such as better profitability, better efficiency, or 
lower cost of funding. Subramanian and Megginson (2011) shows that privatization is 
negatively associated with strictness of labor protections, which might be essential for 
inventor’s productivity (Bradley et al, 2015). Megginson (2010) shows that governments 
typically provide lower levels of monitoring than other private shareholders, and the implicit 
guarantees they offer remove monitoring incentives for other stakeholders.  
Governments, as acquirers, differ from private acquisitions in multiple ways. First of 
all, governments pursue political targets, such as low unemployment rate, which might increase 
the efficiency inside the companies. Second, government ownership is often motivated by the 
desire to maintain competitive advantages of strategic industries; accordingly, governments are 
not keen on allowing those companies to go bankrupt (Borisova et al (2013)). Finally, 
politicians and political related managers do not wish to be associated with a bad investment 
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and would thus hurt their political career. Unwillingness of allowing companies to default 
provide extreme protection for managers and employees. Moreover, government employees 
could shirk or they simply do not have necessary skills or knowledge to be employed in the 
companies because of political appointments and other inefficiencies in the government 
employment sector. Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012) find a lower quality of 
corporate governance in publicly traded firms partially owned by the government when 
compared to firms free from state ownership. Thus we would expect the government 
ownership would discourage innovation outputs. 
Ho: Government ownership would impede corporate innovations. 
However, Borisova and Megginson (2011) show that state influence on debt pricing can 
be non-monotonic, and several factors resulting from state presence could decrease the firms’ 
cost of debt financing. Moreover, Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011) find the state-owned 
banks will decrease the cost of debt of the government-owned firm, so managers would 
increase levels of risk taking projects, Higher risk tolerance from government would also 
encourage the manager to switch from conventional project to risky projects, since successful 
of projects would lead to political reputational awareness and cost of failure is very low. 
Therefore our alternative hypothesis would be the government ownership would encourage 
innovation outputs. 
HA: Government ownership would encourage corporate innovations. 
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3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
Our international patent information are collected from European Patent and Trademark 
office (https://www.epo.org/index.html). This database provides the information of filing date, 
assignee’s information, backward and forward citations, inventors’ name, inventors’ 
nationalities and inventors’ affiliated companies. We construct the complete innovation dataset 
by merging this database with Global COMPUSTAT. Since there are very few information of 
patent application before 1986, the complete innovation dataset covers more than 150 countries 
between 1986 and 2010 along with various firms’ financial statement information such as size, 
tangibility, profitability and investment.  
The government acquisition information are from SDC Platinum. The government 
acquisition database covers the information regarding the effective/withdrawal date of 
acquisition, acquirers’ and targets’ nationalities, acquiring percentage, percentage of 
government ownership after acquisition etc.  
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Figure 1 
This figures plot the average number of patents, citations and citations per patent from 1990 to 
2007. 
 
 
 
10 
 
We merge the government acquisition information with our complete innovation 
dataset based on the 6-digit CUSIP. We delete all transactions before 1990 since there were 
very few government acquisitions, and all transactions after 2007 to alleviate the truncation 
bias in the innovation dataset (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). In figure 1, we find that there 
is minor truncation bias for our innovation dataset. We simply retain the first transaction if 
some companies experienced multiple government acquisition in our sample period. Overall, 
we have 5572 firm-year observations which include 663 unique government acquisitions from 
58 countries in total. 
We construct a number of important firm characteristics based on existing literatures. 
LnAsset represents the log-transformed booking value of asset in dollars for each company in 
our sample period. ROA represents the profitability of companies, calculated by net income 
divided by asset. R&D expenditure is the firm’s R&D expenditure divided by assets. 
Tangibility is a firm’s net property, plant and equipment divided by assets. Investment is a 
firm’s capital expenditure divided by assets. Leverage is a firm’s total debts divided by assets. 
HHI index is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on sales in the first two digits of the SIC 
code. LnAge is log-transformed number of years existing in our sample for a firm in a given 
calendar year. We also construct the following variables as proxies for innovation activities. 
We use LnPatt, log-transformed number of patents applied by each company in our sample 
period as a representative of quantities of innovation. Many researchers believed the patent 
application year is better at capturing the real effect of corporate innovation (Chava et al., 
SLnPatt+N is the number of patents of divided by median number of patents applied within the 
same industry in a country j at year t+N (N=0, 1, 2, 3). SLnCitet+N is number of citations 
divided by mean number of citations received within the same industry in country j at year t+N 
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(N=0, 1, 2, 3). SLnCitePatt+N is number of citations per patent divided by mean number of 
citations per patent received within the same industry in country j at year t+N (N=0, 1, 2, 3). 
We do not exactly follow the procedure of Hall et al (2001) by simply scaling patents or 
citations by median number of patents or citations within same technological class since our 
research is corporate innovation in international level, and we believe there are significant 
difference in inventing abilities of companies across countries. A firm applied 5 patents in 
Bangladesh might be a very innovative company compared with a firm in US with the same 
patent application. Detailed definition of all variables are given in the appendix. Table 1 
provides the summary statistics of all variables in our sample. 
In table 1, the mean number of patents applied by each firm in each year is about 1.97, 
and on average each company will receive 11.63 citations. Each patent will be cited 0.46 times 
on average. The innovation variables are highly skewed, which is consistent with previous 
literature. We do not delete zero patent observation to avoid selection bias. Before the 
government acquisition, the firms had a government ownership of 9.21 percent.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of 5,572 firm-year observations across 58 countries in 
the world. Panel A presents all variables used in our sample. Panel B presents the innovation 
output and government acquisition by country. Patent (Pat) is a number of patents applied by a 
firm in a given calendar year. Citation (Cite) is a number of citations received for a firm’s 
patents in a given calendar year. Cite per Patent (Citepat) is a number of average citations per 
patent received for a firm’s patents in a given calendar year. Ownership Before (OB) is the 
percentage of government ownership before a government acquisition for a firm in a given 
calendar year. Acquiring Percentage (AP) is the percentage of ownership acquired by 
government for a firm in a given calendar year. Ownership After (OA) is the percentage of 
government ownership after a government acquisition for a firm in a given calendar year. Firm 
size is a firm’s book value of assets measured in U.S. dollars. ROA represents profitability of 
the firm, calculate as net income divided by book value of assets. R&D expenditure is firm’s 
R&D expenditure divided by assets. Tangibility is a firm’s net property, plant and equipment 
divided by assets. Investment is a firm’s capital expenditure divided by assets. Leverage is a 
firm’s total debts divided by assets. HHI index is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on sales 
in the first two digits of the SIC code. Firm age is a number of years existed in our sample for 
a firm in a given calendar year. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for All Variables 
 
Variable N Min Max Median Mean Std Dev 
Patents (Pat) 5572 0.000 567.000 0.000 1.971 21.666 
Citations (Cite) 5572 0.000 2931.000 0.000 11.627 116.002 
Cite Per Patent (Citepat) 5572 0.000 25.000 0.000 0.455 1.895 
Ownership Before (OB) 5572 0.000 99.070 0.000 9.209 20.814 
Acquiring Percentage 
(AP) 
5572 0.000 100.000 15.000 26.766 27.446 
Ownership After (OA) 5572 0.100 100.000 22.400 35.972 32.413 
Firm size ($ Millions) 5572 0.725 70299.160 274.641 2484.590 7977.630 
ROA 5572 -0.865 0.279 0.034 0.010 0.153 
R&D Expenditure 5572 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.006 0.022 
Tangibility 5572 0.001 0.911 0.364 0.387 0.240 
Investment 5572 0.000 0.369 0.045 0.065 0.068 
Leverage 5572 0.000 0.903 0.231 0.250 0.195 
HHI index 5572 0.018 1.000 0.241 0.326 0.280 
Firm Age 5572 0.000 20.000 6.000 6.623 4.442 
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Panel B. Innovation Outputs and Government Acquisitions across Countries 
 
Country Pat Cite Citepat OB AP OA Country Pat Cite Citepat OB AP OA 
ARG 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.058 37.717 48.775 ITA 0.064 0.382 0.239 12.429 32.344 44.770 
AUS 0.026 0.259 0.152 1.732 24.866 26.593 JPN 6.973 58.664 2.107 8.318 18.304 26.618 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.720 12.415 38.119 KOR 2.095 10.270 1.694 2.390 23.679 26.065 
BEL 0.214 1.071 0.750 0.000 48.761 48.754 LKA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 51.000 51.000 
BGD 0.000 0.000 0.000 55.500 6.500 62.000 LTU 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.091 43.375 47.455 
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 75.030 6.670 81.700 MAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.700 11.700 
BMU 0.004 0.036 0.036 6.812 17.323 24.128 MEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.000 15.000 
BRA 0.076 0.386 0.133 4.708 33.885 38.588 MLT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 48.882 48.882 
CHE 0.419 2.453 0.716 8.723 29.390 38.113 MYS 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.561 23.218 38.777 
CHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.796 55.859 68.655 NOR 0.014 0.058 0.058 15.400 33.741 49.139 
CHN 0.008 0.050 0.037 8.365 25.957 34.316 NZL 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.698 11.287 36.980 
COL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.792 7.792 OMN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 49.000 49.000 
CYM 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.970 16.875 40.842 PAK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 15.256 15.264 
CZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 28.493 28.726 PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 60.000 60.000 
DEU 7.444 55.715 2.722 16.407 43.036 59.442 PHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 18.902 18.902 
DNK 0.048 0.095 0.095 47.010 21.562 68.571 POL 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.091 17.607 35.698 
EGY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.600 7.600 PRT 0.013 0.092 0.092 2.055 32.500 34.555 
ESP 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.802 27.479 40.281 RUS 0.033 0.319 0.106 21.543 20.166 41.707 
EST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 50.400 50.400 SEN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 33.300 33.300 
FIN 0.817 5.585 1.913 21.679 30.048 51.727 SGP 0.008 0.106 0.106 6.722 26.626 33.346 
FRA 20.899 112.345 1.472 6.843 26.953 33.794 SVK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 8.370 8.400 
GBR 0.838 5.771 1.262 3.991 48.140 52.128 SVN 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.884 9.469 18.353 
GRC 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.482 40.895 50.378 SWE 0.887 4.911 0.964 19.510 46.039 65.548 
HKG 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.900 14.302 38.197 THA 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.576 22.303 38.878 
HUN 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.789 35.576 60.365 TUN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35.000 35.000 
IDN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.221 26.917 27.133 TUR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.000 15.000 
IND 0.681 5.700 0.982 1.580 12.197 13.772 TWN 0.308 1.385 0.974 0.000 10.000 10.000 
ISL 2.000 12.800 5.000 0.000 5.800 5.800 VNM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.000 10.000 
ISR 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.000 18.856 29.856 ZAF 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.035 20.825 25.859 
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After the government acquisition, the government ownership in a firm will 
increase to 35.97 percent with a mean acquiring percentage of 26.77 of total stake of a 
company. A firm’s asset has a mean booking value of 2484 (in millions). Tangible assets, 
R&D expenditure and capital expenditures take up to 38.7, 0.006 and 6.5 percentage of 
total assets respectively. A firm has a mean ROA of 1 percent. A Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index of 32.6 percent shows that a firm will face a moderate competition within the 
industry. For further investigating how government acquisition would affect the corporate 
innovation across countries, we break down our sample into 58 countries. In panel B, 
most innovative countries including Germany, France and Japan, for which mean number 
of patents are all greater than 5, along with a mean number of citations greater than 50. 
However, many firm-year observations in our sample have zero patents and citations 
information. Government ownership is higher in common law countries such as 
Germany, France, Denmark and Finland. Countries from Middle East and Latin America 
also have relatively higher government control. 
In table 2, we investigate the distribution of our sample observations based on 
different characteristics. From panel A, the number of observations is almost 
monotonically increasing over time. In panel B, based on the nationalities of acquirers 
and targets, China is the most important country in our sample. About 20 percent of 
observations are either targets or acquirer of Chinese firms. Companies from Australia, 
France, Hong Kong and Malaysia are the other top 4 acquiring targets. 
4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
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Table 2 
Distribution of the Observations Based on Different Characteristics 
 
This table presents the distribution and proportion of observations in our sample based on 
different year, acquirer and target and different industries. Panel A presents the number of 
observations for each year in our sample. Panel B presents the proportion of observations 
based on nationalities of acquirer and target in our sample. Panel C presents the 
proportion of observations from different industries in our sample. 
 
Panel A. Proportion of Observations for Each Year  
 
YEAR N Proportion 
1990 3 0.0005 
1991 7 0.0013 
1992 14 0.0025 
1993 26 0.0047 
1994 110 0.0197 
1995 130 0.0233 
1996 199 0.0357 
1997 291 0.0522 
1998 396 0.0711 
1999 439 0.0788 
2000 450 0.0808 
2001 475 0.0852 
2002 501 0.0899 
2003 515 0.0924 
2004 518 0.0930 
2005 519 0.0931 
2006 502 0.0901 
2007 477 0.0856 
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Panel B. Proportion of Observations Based on Nationalities of Acquirer and Target 
 
Acquirer Target 
Country N Proportion Country N Proportion 
China 1191 0.2137 China 1107 0.1987 
France 455 0.0817 Australia 407 0.0730 
Singapore 408 0.0732 France 397 0.0712 
Malaysia 316 0.0567 Hong Kong 395 0.0709 
Hong Kong 244 0.0438 Malaysia 371 0.0666 
Australia 228 0.0409 India 307 0.0551 
Italy 181 0.0325 UK 254 0.0456 
UK 160 0.0287 Singapore 225 0.0404 
Brazil 159 0.0285 Brazil 210 0.0377 
Other 2230 0.4002 Other 1899 0.3408 
 
Panel C. Proportion of Observations in Different Industries 
 
Target SIC Description of Target SIC N Proportion 
0 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 49 0.0088 
1 Mining, construction 437 0.0784 
2 Manufacturing (food, fabric, wood, chemical) 1309 0.2349 
3 Manufacturing (rubber, plastic, glass, metal; boat, rail, air equipment) 1397 0.2507 
4 Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary service 1399 0.2511 
5 Trade (Wholesale, retail) 385 0.0691 
6 Finance, insurance and real estate 43 0.0077 
7 Services (hotel, beauty, funeral, computer, car rental & repair, movie) 412 0.0739 
8 Services (doctor's offices, legal, schools, religious, accounting) 63 0.0113 
9 Public and non-classified establishments 78 0.0140 
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To investigate how government acquisition would affect the corporate innovation, we 
construct the following model which could be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡+𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐴 + 𝜃𝑛𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡+𝑁 
Innot+N are the innovation proxies specified in the previous section, including 
LnPatt,, LnCitet or LnCitePatt. We use the leading innovation output at year t+N (N=1, 2, 
3) to capture the potential lagging effect of government acquisition on innovation (Hall et 
al, 2001). Yeart, Countryj, Indusk represent year, country and industry fixed effect. OA 
represents the percentage of government ownership after acquisition. X represents firm 
characteristic variables that are defined in the previous section. In this model, OA is the 
main variable which indicates the relationship between government ownership and 
corporate innovation activities. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Table 
3 provides the detailed results of baseline regressions.  
In table 3, we find that corporate innovation is negatively related to the 
government ownership. Coefficients for OA are all negatively significant for all 
innovation proxies, which indicates a strong negative effect of government control on 
innovation. Specially, the number of patents, citations and citations per patent will 
decrease 15.23 percent, 24.26 percent and 10.27 percent one year after the government 
acquisition respectively. The effect of government control is statistically and 
economically nontrivial. Additionally, the results of baseline regressions also real that 
larger firm with less tangible assets or leverage and more R&D expenditures will have 
higher innovation output, which are consistent with previous literatures.  
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Table 3 
Baseline Regressions: Ownership after Acquisitions and Innovation 
 
This table presents OLS results regressing percentage of government ownership after 
acquisition and other firm characteristics on corporate innovation measures with year, 
country and industry fixed effects. LnPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents 
applied by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). LnCitet+N is a log-transformed number of 
citations received by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). LnCitepatt+N is a log-
transformed number of citations per patent received by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 
3). OA is the percentage of government ownership after acquisition. LnAssets is the log-
transformed of firm size. ROA represents profitability of the firm, calculate as net income 
divided by book value of assets. R&D is firm’s R&D expenditure divided by assets. 
Tangibility is a firm’s net property, plant and equipment by assets. Investment is a firm’s 
capital expenditure divided by assets. Leverage is a firm’s total debts divided by assets. 
HHI index is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on sales in the first two digits of the 
SIC code. LnAge is the log-transformed of firm age. All coefficients for year, country and 
industry dummies are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
computed using standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-adjusted. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  LnPatt+N LnCitet+N LnCitepatt+N 
  N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
OA -0.1523*** -0.1619*** -0.1638*** -0.2426*** -0.2495*** -0.2501*** -0.1027*** -0.1014*** -0.1006*** 
 (-6.63) (-6.97) (-7.15) (-6.30) (-6.51) (-6.63) (-4.75) (-4.83) (-4.86) 
LnAssets 0.1004*** 0.1030*** 0.1031*** 0.1398*** 0.1427*** 0.1394*** 0.0449*** 0.0457*** 0.0427*** 
 (10.19) (10.11) (9.98) (10.32) (10.29) (9.97) (8.29) (8.51) (7.99) 
Tangibility -0.1747*** -0.1853*** -0.1826*** -0.2732*** -0.2893*** -0.2663*** -0.1100*** -0.1196*** -0.0956*** 
 (-5.82) (-6.13) (-6.02) (-5.54) (-5.96) (-5.56) (-4.07) (-4.59) (-3.80) 
ROA -0.1079** -0.1252*** -0.1254*** -0.1259* -0.1747** -0.1520** -0.0198 -0.0551 -0.0244 
 (-2.38) (-2.74) (-2.76) (-1.65) (-2.29) (-1.99) (-0.44) (-1.29) (-0.54) 
Debt -0.1455*** -0.1368*** -0.1306*** -0.1984*** -0.1880*** -0.1723*** -0.0582* -0.0602* -0.0439 
 (-3.55) (-3.30) (-3.15) (-3.06) (-2.89) (-2.66) (-1.66) (-1.72) (-1.30) 
Invest 0.1183 0.1308* 0.1260* 0.1651 0.1868 0.1947 0.0510 0.0769 0.0812 
 (1.61) (1.79) (1.69) (1.28) (1.52) (1.58) (0.66) (1.12) (1.18) 
R&D 4.8145*** 4.3910*** 4.1145*** 8.4879*** 7.4408*** 6.9547*** 4.3044*** 3.4899*** 3.3616*** 
 (7.74) (6.91) (6.63) (8.25) (7.21) (6.94) (7.45) (6.31) (6.00) 
HHI 0.0824** 0.0847** 0.0626* 0.1775*** 0.1728*** 0.1371** 0.1321*** 0.1276*** 0.1127*** 
 (2.39) (2.42) (1.85) (2.96) (2.91) (2.39) (3.54) (3.50) (3.17) 
LnAge 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0170 0.0191 0.0163 0.0221* 0.0255** 0.0233** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (-0.07) (0.79) (0.89) (0.78) (1.82) (2.23) (2.11) 
Constant -1.1106*** -1.1275*** -0.8788*** -1.6983*** -1.6954*** -0.7539 -0.7210*** -0.6994*** 0.2244 
 (-6.70) (-6.08) (-2.87) (-6.10) (-5.50) (-0.92) (-4.20) (-3.91) (0.32) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 
Adj. R2 0.284 0.283 0.277 0.301 0.296 0.284 0.269 0.262 0.246 
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The baseline model reveals a naive negative relationship between government 
control and innovation. However, this relationship might subject to many endogeneity 
issues. For example, the corporate innovation might be already lower for the companies 
with higher government ownership, and it would be reasonable to suspect there are some 
other factors impede the corporate innovation rather than government acquisition. To 
further addressing those concerns, we employ a difference-in-difference regressions and 
investigate how the corporate innovation varies after government acquisition between 
treatment group and control group. We define the treatment group as the companies that 
are experiencing a government acquisition in our sample, and the control group as the 
companies that are never owned by government in our sample period. To correct for 
systematical difference between treatment group and control group, we use a propensity 
score matching method, which match each observation from treatment group with an 
observation from control group based on several firm characteristics. Following 
D’Agostino (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005), we use the following nearest neighbor 
matching which could be expressed as: 
𝐶(𝑃𝑖) = min
𝑗
‖𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗‖ 
Where Pi and Pj are the propensity scores calculated from treatment group and 
control group based on different firm characteristics respectively. There will be a 1 on 1 
matching between treatment and control group if the distance of propensity score is 
minimized. However, some observations from treatment might not have the matching 
observations if we could not find them. After the matching, we use the following model 
to conduct difference-in-difference regressions: 
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𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡+𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 + 𝜃𝑛𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡+𝑁 
Again Innot+N are the innovation proxies specified in the previous section, 
including LnPatt,, LnCitet or LnCitePatt at year t, t+1 and t+2. We still include year, 
country and firm fixed effects in our regressions. Post*Acquire is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one after the government acquisition for treatment group at year m (t ≥m) 
and zero otherwise. Comparing the difference of innovation activities between treatment 
and control group reveals the real effect of government control and further controls the 
endogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at firm level since Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) believe firm clustering standard error is better at correcting serial correlation 
across firms. X represents firm characteristic variables that are specified in the previous 
section. Table 4 provides the results of difference-in-difference regressions. 
Panel A provides the results of propensity score matching. There are 10,467 
observations in total after the matching. The Probit regression of different firm 
characteristics on the dummy variable which separates the treatment and control group 
indicates that there are no systematically difference for the observations between 
treatment and control except that the tangibility is significant at 10 percent level. Panel B 
provides the results of difference-in-difference regressions. The coefficients for 
Post*Acquire are all negatively significant at 1 percent level except of LnCitePat at year 
t+1 and t+2. Especially the quantity of innovation will decrease 12.17 percent and 
quality of innovation will also decrease 17.47 percent after the government acquisition. 
This negative relationship shows that compared with control group, the treatment group 
exhibits a significant decline in corporate innovation after the government acquisition.  
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Table 4 
Difference-in-Difference Regressions after Propensity Score Matching 
 
The table presents the results of difference-in-difference (DD) regressions after 
propensity score matching (PSM). Panel A presents the results of PSM. Treat is equal to 
1 for a firm-year observation experiencing a government acquisition in our sample and 
zero otherwise. We match each observation in our sample with another firm-year 
observation that is never owned by government using the method of nearest neighbor 
based on different firm characteristics. Panel B presents the results of DD regressions 
with year, country and firm fixed effects. LnPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents 
applied by a firm at year t+N (N=0, 1, and 2). LnCitet+N is a log-transformed number of 
citations received by a firm at year t+N (N=0, 1, and 2). LnCitepatt+N is a log-
transformed number of citations per patent received by a firm at year t+N (N=0, 1, and 
2). Post*Acquire is equal to one after a firm experiencing any government acquisition in 
year m (t ≥ m) and zero otherwise. All coefficients for year, country and firm dummies 
are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Results of Propensity Score Matching 
 
  Treat 
LnAssets 0.0029 
 (0.44) 
Tangibility 0.0997* 
 (1.65) 
ROA 0.0247 
 (0.99) 
Debt -0.0494 
 (-1.20) 
Invest -0.0187 
 (-0.10) 
HHI 0.0676 
 (1.58) 
LnAge -0.0080 
 (-0.49) 
Constant 0.0337 
  (0.75) 
N 10,467 
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Panel B. Results of Difference-in-Difference Regressions 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  LnPatt+N LnCitet+N LnCitepatt+N 
  N=0 N=1 N=2 N=0 N=1 N=2 N=0 N=1 N=2 
Post*Acquire -0.1217*** -0.1151*** -0.1157*** -0.1747*** -0.1398*** -0.1392*** -0.0791*** -0.0361 -0.0359* 
 (-3.36) (-3.12) (-3.07) (-3.48) (-2.93) (-2.94) (-2.98) (-1.61) (-1.74) 
LnAssets 0.0376*** 0.0247* 0.0113 0.0608*** 0.0331 0.0180 0.0286* 0.0123 0.0083 
 (3.19) (1.94) (0.68) (2.68) (1.38) (0.67) (1.83) (0.78) (0.57) 
Tangibility -0.0283 -0.0419 -0.0261 -0.0416 -0.0581 -0.0847 -0.0194 -0.0120 -0.0756 
 (-0.60) (-0.82) (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-1.01) (-0.35) (-0.19) (-1.29) 
ROA 0.0066 0.0071 0.0007 0.0172 0.0186 0.0008 0.0130* 0.0134* -0.0010 
 (1.39) (1.30) (0.24) (1.64) (1.61) (0.13) (1.87) (1.79) (-0.20) 
Debt 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0003 0.0047 0.0054 -0.0004 0.0045 0.0045 -0.0008 
 (0.52) (0.52) (-0.17) (1.04) (1.05) (-0.14) (1.44) (1.35) (-0.33) 
Invest 0.0282 0.0617 0.0454 0.0450 0.1300 0.0860 0.0169 0.0910 0.0592 
 (0.54) (1.18) (0.91) (0.41) (1.17) (0.85) (0.20) (1.03) (0.76) 
HHI 0.0471 0.0310 -0.0030 0.0553 0.0281 -0.0927 0.0089 -0.0103 -0.1252 
 (0.66) (0.47) (-0.05) (0.41) (0.22) (-0.76) (0.10) (-0.11) (-1.47) 
LnAge 0.0356 0.0402 0.0462* 0.0575 0.0543 0.0768* 0.0260 0.0133 0.0324 
 (1.49) (1.61) (1.77) (1.33) (1.24) (1.76) (0.90) (0.45) (1.14) 
R&D -0.0000 0.0179 0.1331 -0.0705 0.0527 0.2387 -0.1097 0.0160 0.1243 
 (-0.00) (0.15) (0.95) (-0.23) (0.21) (0.71) (-0.54) (0.09) (0.49) 
Constant -0.3009 -0.2472 -0.0090 -0.4287 -0.2989 -0.0717 -0.1139 -0.0355 -0.0598 
 (-0.70) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-0.56) (-0.39) (-0.11) (-0.28) (-0.09) (-0.13) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 
Adj. R2 0.803 0.787 0.782 0.758 0.743 0.746 0.641 0.629 0.636 
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We rerun the model by using bootstrap standard errors and heteroskedasticity-
corrected standard errors and still obtain very strong negative relationship between 
government acquisition and corporate innovation. We also provide the results by using 
scaled patent and citations in the appendix and we still have very consistent results.  
Difference-in-difference regressions provide the direct evidence that government 
control do relevant for corporate innovation activities. However, there is still a concern of 
reverse causality, which implies that corporate innovation might happen before the 
government acquisition or bad performance of companies in corporate innovation induces 
the government to step in and take control to monitor. To further considering those 
effects, we construct the following model which could be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡+𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑗 + 𝜏1𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 ≤ −3) +
𝜏2𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 = −2) + 𝜏3𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 = 0) + 𝜏4𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 = 1) + 𝜏5𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 = 2) +
𝜏5𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒 (𝑡 ≥ 3) + 𝜃𝑖𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡+𝑁  
 We still use LnPatt,, LnCitet or LnCitePatt at year t, t+1 and t+2 as proxies for 
corporate innovation. Acquire (t=N) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 representing 
N years before or after the year of government acquisition (N=0, 1, 2, 3). Acquire (t=0) is 
the event year for government acquiring. We still include year, country and firm fixed 
effects along with firm characteristics in our model. The standard errors are clustered at 
firm level. If there is no pre-trend or reverse causality issue for corporate innovation 
activities, we will expect the coefficients of τ1 and τ2 to be insignificant. Table 5 provides 
the results of dynamic model. 
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Table 5 
Dynamic Model 
 
The table presents the results of dynamic model with year, country and firm fixed effects. 
LnPatt is a log-transformed number of patents applied by a firm at year t. LnCitet is a log-
transformed number of citations received by a firm at year t. LnCitepatt is a log-
transformed number of citations per patent received by a firm at year t. Acquire (t=n) 
represents n years (-3 ≤n ≤3) before or after the government acquisition for treatment 
firms. Acquire (t=0) is the event year for the treatment firms. All coefficients for firm 
characteristics, year, country and firm dummies are omitted for brevity. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  LnPatt LnCitet LnCitepatt 
Acquire (t<=-3) 0.0203 0.0233 -0.0003 
 (1.13) (0.68) (-0.01) 
Acquire (t=-2) -0.0186 -0.0338 -0.0254 
 (-1.12) (-1.00) (-0.95) 
Acquire (t=0) -0.0989*** -0.1479*** -0.0772*** 
 (-3.38) (-3.33) (-2.75) 
Acquire (t=1) -0.1153*** -0.1698*** -0.0833*** 
 (-3.26) (-3.30) (-2.71) 
Acquire (t=2) -0.1259*** -0.1727*** -0.0753** 
 (-3.02) (-2.86) (-2.19) 
Acquire (t>=3) -0.1885*** -0.2852*** -0.1373*** 
 (-3.83) (-4.03) (-3.33) 
Control YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
N 10,467 10,467 10,467 
Adj. R2 0.803 0.759 0.641 
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In table 5, we find that the coefficients for are all insignificant no matter what 
innovation proxies are used. However, the coefficients for concurrent dummy variables 
are also very significant at 1 percent level. This is puzzling since it takes time to innovate. 
Kondo (1999) believes that R&D investment creates patent application at a time lag of 
two or three years. Chava et al (2013) also document an immediate impact of bank 
deregulation on innovation even though this phenomenon is quite surprising. Overall, the 
results of dynamic model alleviate the concerns of reverse causality. We also provides the 
results by using scaled patents and citations in the appendix and we still have consistent 
results. 
5. Potential Channel 
In this section we turn to the question why government control impede the 
corporate innovation and through what channels. First of all, we separate our sample into 
two groups; one group of observations that have no government ownership before 
acquisition, and the other group observations that have some government ownership 
before the acquisition. We rerun the propensity score matching for each sub-sample and 
difference-in-difference regressions again to investigate which group is more likely to be 
affected by stronger government control. Because from our statistical software we cannot 
tell which observation from control group is matched to which observation from 
treatment group, we could not simply divide the sample based on matching results from 
table 4. However, when we rerun the propensity score matching, the matching 
observations might change when compared with the matching observations from table 4.  
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Table 6 
Difference-in-Difference regressions: Sub-sample Propensity Score Matching 
 
The table presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions after propensity 
score matching (PSM) for two sub-sample group: firms that have some government 
ownership before acquisition, and firms that have no government ownership before the 
acquisition. Panel A presents the results of PSM. Treat is equal to 1 if firms are from 
treatment group and zero otherwise. We match each observation from each sub-sample 
group with another firm-year observation that is never owned by government using the 
method of nearest neighbor based on different firm characteristics. Panel B presents the 
results of difference-in-difference regressions for each sub-sample group with year, 
country and firm fixed effect after PSM. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed 
using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Results of Propensity Score Matching 
 
  No Government Ownership 
Before Acquisition 
Owned by Government 
Before Acquisition  
  Treat Treat 
LnAssets 0.0012 -0.0011 
 (0.14) (-0.11) 
Tangibility -0.0276 0.0374 
 (-0.34) (0.47) 
ROA 0.1000* 0.0144 
 (1.88) (0.22) 
Debt -0.0061 0.0257 
 (-0.12) (0.31) 
Invest 0.0976 -0.2336 
 (0.40) (-0.86) 
HHI 0.0177 0.0104 
 (0.32) (0.16) 
LnAge 0.0016 -0.0405* 
 (0.07) (-1.65) 
Constant 0.0407 0.0781 
 (0.69) (1.12) 
N 5,769 5,119 
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Panel B. Result of Difference-in-Difference Regressions 
 
  No Government Ownership Before 
Acquisition 
Owned by Government Before 
Acquisition   
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  LnPatt LnCitet LnCitepatt LnPatt LnCitet LnCitepatt 
Post*Acquire -0.1342** -0.1924** -0.0748** -0.0327 -0.0402 -0.0004 
 (-2.38) (-2.55) (-2.16) (-0.71) (-0.55) (-0.01) 
LnAssets 0.0399* 0.0667* 0.0315 0.0044 0.0009 0.0011 
 (1.93) (1.92) (1.53) (0.31) (0.02) (0.05) 
Tangibility -0.0985 -0.1472 -0.0538 -0.0505 -0.0975 -0.0556 
 (-1.43) (-1.19) (-0.70) (-1.24) (-1.10) (-0.89) 
ROA -0.0035 -0.0038 0.0006 0.0120 0.0334 0.0286 
 (-0.48) (-0.24) (0.05) (0.70) (0.84) (0.92) 
Debt -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0013 0.0227 0.0621 0.0553 
 (-0.88) (-0.60) (-0.22) (0.91) (1.07) (1.15) 
Invest 0.0397 0.0790 0.0490 0.0178 0.0177 0.0102 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.42) (0.29) (0.14) (0.12) 
HHI 0.0501 0.0936 0.0633 0.0467 0.0834 0.0499 
 (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.68) (0.62) (0.54) 
LnAge 0.0488 0.0840 0.0386 0.0121 0.0037 -0.0052 
 (1.46) (1.39) (1.00) (0.31) (0.05) (-0.11) 
R&D 0.0312 0.0639 -0.0059 -0.1928 -0.4663 -0.3016 
 (0.17) (0.18) (-0.02) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-0.88) 
Constant 0.0810 0.1876 0.1436 0.1142 0.2295 0.1185 
 (0.45) (0.58) (0.70) (1.35) (1.28) (1.09) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,119 5,119 5,119 
Adj. R2 0.834 0.798 0.696 0.880 0.838 0.724 
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The Table 6 provides the results of sub-sample matching and difference-in-difference 
regressions. In panel A, we find that there is no systematical difference between treatment and 
control group for both sub-sample based on the results of Probit regressions. In panel B, we 
find that the negative impact of government control is only significant for the group that has no 
government ownership before the acquisition. La Porta et al (2001) argue that government 
ownership are usually associated with political requirements or targets rather than simply 
maximizing shareholders value. Innovation is somehow risky project with uncertainty. 
Managers who have political connect might resist to invest in risky projects since failure of 
those projects will damage their careers. We observe that the group with no government 
ownership before is more likely to be influenced by these negative impact once government 
become shareholders. However, the negative impact will be shrink for the group that has 
governmental shareholders already.  
The other potential channel is the conflict of interest between major and minor 
shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) believe major shareholders would like to pursue 
private benefits at the cost of minor shareholders, for example, the major shareholders might 
initial investment that are too risky for minor shareholders. If government become the major 
shareholders and to achieve their political goals, managers will be more likely to shut down 
risk projects and turn to conventional projects. Maintaining stability of companies’ earning 
becomes priority even though innovative projects might bring abnormal returns in the future. 
To confirm our prediction, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and examine 
whether corporate innovation decrease after government becomes major shareholders. We 
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employ a nonparametric local linear estimation around the threshold of 50% defined by Imbens 
and Kalyanaraman (2012). The model could be expressed as:  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡+𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝑃𝑙(𝑣, 𝑐) + 𝑃𝑟(𝑣, 𝑐) + 𝜀𝑡+𝑁 
Innot+N still represents LnPatt,, LnCitet or LnCitePatt at year t, t+1 and t+2 as proxies 
for corporate innovation. Ownership is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
government ownership is greater than or equal to 50 percent, and zero otherwise. Pl(v,c) and 
Pr(v, c) is the polynomial function on the left and right hand side of threshold. c equals 50 
percent in our setting. v represents the total government ownership. Triangle and uniform 
kernel are used in the regressions. Table 7 provides the results of regression discontinuity 
design.  
In table 7, we find that the coefficients for ownership are all negatively significant 
across all innovation proxies, which indicates the corporate innovation significantly drops after 
the government become the major shareholders in the company. The magnitude of decline in 
corporate innovation is also nontrivial. For example, the number of citations drops about 14.03 
percent and 16.83 percent one year and two years after the government becomes major 
shareholders respectively. In figure 2, we also can observe a gap around the cutoff point for all 
innovation proxies. The results of RDD confirm that there is a conflict of interest between 
major and minor shareholders.   
Our next question will be whether conflict of interest between major and minor 
shareholders would lead to an underinvestment problem. Managers will have concerns that an 
unsuccessful risky project might damage their political career, which will make the managers 
resist to invest in risky project and lower their risk tolerance. To further investigate this issue,  
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Table 7 
Regression Discontinuity Design: Conflict of Interest between Major and Minor Shareholder 
 
The table presents results of local regression discontinuity design using optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Triangle and 
uniform kernel is used in the regressions. LnPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents applied by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). LnCitet+N is a 
log-transformed number of citations received by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). LnCitepatt+N is a log-transformed number of citations per patent 
received by a firm at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). Ownership is a dummy variable that is equal to one if acquiring percent is greater than or equal to 50 
percent, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  LnPatt+N LnCitet+N LnCitepatt+N 
  N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
Ownership -0.0344*** -0.0359** -0.0476*** -0.1403*** -0.1376*** -0.1683*** -0.0384 -0.0477** -0.0455* 
 (-2.73) (-2.47) (-2.71) (-3.60) (-3.37) (-3.65) (-1.58) (-1.97) (-1.86) 
Kernal Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle 
N 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 
  LnPatt+N LnCitet+N LnCitepatt+N 
  N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
Ownership -0.0393** -0.0443** -0.0576*** -0.1087** -0.1190** -0.1391*** -0.0815** -0.0829** -0.1530*** 
 (-2.27) (-2.41) (-2.64) (-2.33) (-2.46) (-2.68) (-2.36) (-2.52) (-3.27) 
Kernal Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform 
N 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 
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Table 8 
Innovation Efficiency 
 
The table presents the results of difference-in-difference regression for R&D expenditure and 
innovation efficiency with year, country and firm fixed effects. R&D is firm’s R&D expenditure 
divided by assets. Pat/∑R&D(t,t-3) is the number of patents applied for a firm scaled by weighted R&D 
expenditure between year t-3 and year t in a given year. Cite/∑R&D(t,t-3) is the number of citations 
received for a firm scaled by weighted R&D expenditure between year t-3 and year t in a given year. 
CitePat/∑R&D(t,t-3) is the number of citations per patent received for a firm scaled by weighted R&D 
expenditure between year t-3 and year t in a given year. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics 
computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  R&D Pat/∑R&D(t, t-3) Cite/∑R&D(t, t-3) CitePat/∑R&D(t, t-3) 
Post*Acquir
e 
0.0013 -0.0157*** -0.1009** -0.0359** 
 (0.42) (-2.73) (-2.50) (-2.10) 
LnAssets -0.0062*** 0.0000 -0.0087 -0.0045 
 (-2.65) (0.01) (-0.33) (-0.41) 
Tangibility 0.0038 0.0078 0.0514 -0.0031 
 (0.29) (0.50) (0.50) (-0.07) 
ROA -0.0057 0.0078** 0.0504** 0.0242** 
 (-1.23) (2.03) (1.99) (2.11) 
Debt -0.0021 0.0030* 0.0201* 0.0100** 
 (-1.13) (1.92) (1.93) (2.10) 
Invest 0.0050 0.0261 0.2311 0.0949 
 (0.48) (0.88) (1.21) (1.09) 
HHI -0.0004 -0.0078 -0.0607 -0.0461 
 (-0.09) (-0.51) (-0.62) (-1.11) 
LnAge 0.0057* -0.0100 -0.0529 -0.0176 
 (1.79) (-1.17) (-0.95) (-0.74) 
Constant 0.0489*** -0.0088 0.0038 0.0600 
 (3.68) (-0.27) (0.02) (0.82) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 
Adj. R2 0.709 0.570 0.545 0.539 
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we replace the innovation proxies with R&D expenditure, which is usually considered as 
the direct input of corporate innovation activities and rerun the difference-in-difference 
regressions. Table 8 provides the results. However, we did not find the R&D expenditure 
significant decrease after the government acquisition for treatment firms.  
Even though the investment for innovation is not decreasing after government 
acquisition, the declining in corporate innovation is still puzzling. La Porta et al (2002) find 
that countries associated with higher government ownership of banks usually exhibit lower 
efficiency, low growth and more severe corruption. Inspired by their spirits, we create 
following three variables representing efficiency of innovation. 
𝑃𝑎𝑡
∑ 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑇−2
=
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
0.8 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡 + 0.6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 0.4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−2 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−3
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒
∑ 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑇−2
=
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
0.8 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡 + 0.6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 0.4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−2 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−3
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡
∑ 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑇−2
=
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡
0.8 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡 + 0.6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 0.4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−2 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−3
 
The innovation efficiency variables are the innovation output scaled by all past three 
years input-R&D expenditures and they indicate the innovation output per R&D 
expenditure. As we mentioned, government ownership might have some social-desirable 
targets such as maintaining employment in the company. Even though the employee might 
face lower dismissal risk, better protection might increase their shirking behavior and 
company will have difficulty to fire inefficiency employees. (Bradley et al, 2015; Francis et 
al, 2015). If this prediction is true, we will expect the innovation efficiency also drops after 
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the government acquisition. We replace all dependent variables with innovation efficiency 
variables and rerun the difference-in-difference regressions. 
From second to forth column of table 8, we find that all three innovation efficiency 
variables are significant decreased after the acquisition, which confirm our prediction that 
government control leads to lower efficiency of investment. The decline in corporate 
innovation might be partially due to the lower efficiency of employees.  
Finally, we separate our entire sample into two groups based on difference 
characteristics. First of all, we divide the sample into two groups based on the government 
ownership of banks. La Porta et al (2002) provide the evidence that higher government 
ownership of banks are usually associated with lower efficiency, lower growth, bad 
monitoring and more sever corruption problems. We expect the group with higher 
government ownership of banks will be experiencing higher decline in corporate innovation 
since agency problem between employers and employees will be more severe. From table 
9, we find the results are consistent with our prediction. The group with higher government 
ownership of banks is experiencing more significant decrease in corporate innovation. 
Secondly, we divide our sample into two groups based on creditor right, and we find that 
negative effect of government control is more severe for group with better creditor 
protections. Finally, we divide our sample into two groups based on stock market 
development, which is calculated by stock market capitalization/GDP. Better financial 
development provides more external funding medium so the negative effect from 
government will be mitigated if government decide to cut the internal investment funding 
directly. Companies still could raise the fund which is necessary for innovative projects 
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Table 9 
Sub-Sample Analysis 
 
The table presents results of difference-in-difference regressions with different sub-sample analysis. LnPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents 
applied by a firm at year t+N (N=0 and 2). LnCitet+N is a log-transformed number of citations received by a firm at year t+N (N=0 and 2). LnCitepatt+N 
is a log-transformed number of citations per patent received by a firm at year t+N (N=0 and 2). Post*Acquire is equal to one after a firm experiencing 
any government acquisition in year m (t ≥ m) and zero otherwise. Government ownership of banks, creditor rights index and stock market Cap./GDP are 
from La Porta et al (2002). All coefficients for firm characteristic variables, year, country, firm dummies are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parenthesis 
are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 LnPatt+N Lncitet+N LnCitepatt+n LnPatt+N Lncitet+N LnCitepatt+n 
  N=0 N=2 N=0 N=2 N=0 N=2 N=0 N=2 N=0 N=2 N=0 N=2 
 High Government Ownership of Banks Low Government Ownership of Banks 
Post*Acquire -0.1610*** -0.1666*** -0.2269*** -0.2189*** -0.0906*** -0.0727*** -0.0543* -0.0339 -0.0923 -0.0259 -0.0645 0.0075 
 (-3.20) (-3.18) (-3.33) (-3.35) (-2.66) (-2.65) (-1.83) (-1.31) (-1.45) (-0.57) (-1.38) (0.25) 
N 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,308 5,308 5,308 5,308 5,308 5,308 
Adj. R2 0.791 0.765 0.761 0.752 0.645 0.661 0.824 0.813 0.755 0.741 0.629 0.607 
 Better Creditor Rights Worse Creditor Righter 
Post*Acquire -0.1650*** -0.1549*** -0.2583*** -0.2009*** -0.1289** -0.0702* -0.0957** -0.0882* -0.1222** -0.1024* -0.0454 -0.0197 
 (-2.82) (-2.92) (-2.97) (-2.69) (-2.56) (-1.79) (-2.06) (-1.73) (-1.99) (-1.71) (-1.55) (-0.91) 
N 4,824 4,824 4,824 4,824 4,824 4,824 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643 
Adj. R2 0.816 0.782 0.755 0.737 0.620 0.616 0.782 0.780 0.757 0.754 0.656 0.652 
 High Stock Mkt Cap/GDP Low Stock Mkt Cap/GDP 
Post*Acquire -0.0670** -0.0345 -0.1225* -0.0172 -0.0853 0.0177 -0.1497*** -0.1602*** -0.2042*** -0.2129*** -0.0785** -0.0728*** 
 (-2.01) (-1.18) (-1.70) (-0.33) (-1.61) (0.52) (-3.16) (-3.24) (-3.21) (-3.49) (-2.52) (-2.92) 
N 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,311 5,311 5,311 5,311 5,311 5,311 
Adj. R2 0.829 0.809 0.761 0.735 0.624 0.600 0.782 0.763 0.750 0.752 0.639 0.659 
Control YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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from open market. We find the results is consistent with our prediction, the group with 
worse financial development is more likely to be affected. 
6. Conclusion 
We provide the evidence that government ownership impede the corporate 
innovation by using a difference-in-difference regressions. We show that there is conflict 
of interest between major shareholders and minor shareholders. The corporate innovation 
efficiency also decline after the government acquisition. We find that this negative 
relationship is more severe for the group with higher government ownership of banks, 
better creditor rights and worse stock market development.  
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Appendix A 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
LnPatt+N Log transform of number of patents granted by a firm in year t+N (N=0,1,2,3). 
LnCitet+N 
Log transform of number of non-self-citations received by a firm in year t+N 
(N=0,1,2,3). 
LnCitePatt+N 
Log transform of number of non-self-citations per patent received by a firm in 
year t+N (N=0,1,2,3). 
SPatt+N 
The number of patents of divided by median number of patents applied within 
the same industry in a country j at year t+N (N=0, 1, 2, 3) 
SCitet+N 
The number of citations divided by mean number of citations received within 
the same industry in country j at year t+N (N=0, 1, 2, 3).  
SCitePatt+N 
The number of citations per patent divided by mean number of citations per 
patent received within the same industry in country j at year t+N (N=0, 1, 2, 3). 
Ln(asset) Log transform of firm total assets. Assets are Global COMPUSTAT item [AT]. 
ROA 
Returns on Asset: net income divided by book value of total assets. Net income 
is 
Global COMPUSTAT item [NICON]. 
Tangibility 
Tangible assets as a proportion of total assets: Net property, plant and 
equipment 
divided by total assets. Net property, plant and equipment is Global 
COMPUSTAT 
item [PPENT]. 
Invest 
Capital expenditure divided by total assets: capital expenditure is Global 
COMPUSTAT item [CAPX]. 
Leverage 
Book debt ratio: total debts divided by total assets. Total debts=Global 
COUPUSTAT item ([DLC]+[ DLTT]). 
R&D 
R&D expenses divided by total assets. R&D expenses are Global 
COMPUSTAT 
item [XRD]. 
HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index scaled by the sales; constructed by using total 
sales in each company based on the first two digits of SIC code. 
LnAge 
The log-transformed number of years existing in our sample for a firm in a 
given calendar year.  
OB Percentage of government ownership before acquisition, from SDC Platinum 
OA Percentage of government ownership after acquisition, from SDC Platinum 
Post*Acquire 
An indicator variable that is equal to one after the government acquisition for 
treatment group at year m (t ≥m) and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B 
Baseline Regressions: Scaled Innovation Proxies 
 
This table presents OLS results regressing percentage of government ownership after 
acquisition and other firm characteristics on corporate innovation measures with year, 
country and industry fixed effects. SPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents applied 
by a firm scaled by average number of patents applied in industry k of country i at year 
t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). SCitet+N is a log-transformed number of citations received by a firm 
scaled by average number of citations received in industry k of country i at year t+N 
(N=1, 2, and 3). SCitepatt+N is a log-transformed number of citations per patent received 
by a firm scaled by average number of citations per patent received in industry k of 
country i at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). OA is the percentage of government ownership 
after acquisition. LnAssets is the log-transformed of firm size. ROA represents 
profitability of the firm, calculate as net income divided by book value of assets. R&D is 
firm’s R&D expenditure divided by assets. Tangibility is a firm’s capital expenditure 
divided by assets. Investment is a firm’s capital expenditure divided by assets. Leverage 
is a firm’s total debts divided by assets. HHI index is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
based on sales in the first two digits of the SIC code. LnAge is the log-transformed of 
firm age. All coefficients for year, country and industry dummies are omitted for brevity. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  SPatt+N SCitet+N SCitepatt+n 
  N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
OA -0.4328 -0.6203*** -0.7249*** -0.4712 -0.6458*** -0.7690*** 0.0327 -0.1122 -0.2537** 
 (-1.40) (-2.61) (-4.64) (-1.53) (-2.74) (-5.00) (0.11) (-0.54) (-2.21) 
LnAssets 0.5000*** 0.5135*** 0.5154*** 0.4900*** 0.5109*** 0.4892*** 0.1693*** 0.2080*** 0.1601*** 
 (7.07) (7.22) (7.86) (7.00) (7.25) (7.50) (3.51) (4.43) (3.47) 
Tangibility -0.6659** -0.6463** -0.5956** -0.7314** -0.6755** -0.5503** -0.3006 -0.2575 -0.0512 
 (-2.37) (-2.56) (-2.48) (-2.52) (-2.53) (-2.26) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-0.22) 
ROA -0.5851* -0.6583* -0.5486* -0.4398 -0.5839* -0.3194 0.3222 -0.0802 0.2478 
 (-1.68) (-1.91) (-1.69) (-1.28) (-1.72) (-0.99) (0.89) (-0.25) (0.86) 
Debt -1.5426*** -1.3081*** -1.1976*** -1.3792*** -1.1370*** -1.1519*** -0.3775 -0.1784 -0.1033 
 (-3.86) (-3.40) (-3.15) (-3.50) (-3.00) (-3.05) (-1.53) (-0.83) (-0.53) 
Invest 2.8298* 2.8658*** 2.5914** 2.6264* 2.1757** 2.3435** 1.2124 0.6159 0.5811 
 (1.88) (2.61) (2.53) (1.75) (2.29) (2.41) (0.85) (0.85) (0.79) 
R&D 23.9225*** 21.0303*** 21.4643*** 24.3320*** 21.4991*** 22.9929*** 13.7355*** 8.4593** 10.3850*** 
 (5.52) (5.01) (5.07) (5.49) (5.02) (5.11) (2.73) (2.00) (2.79) 
HHI 0.3655* 0.2317 0.1664 0.3910** 0.2548 0.2069 0.1111 0.0174 0.0303 
 (1.86) (1.12) (0.80) (2.04) (1.25) (1.02) (0.76) (0.11) (0.19) 
LnAge 0.0122 0.0011 0.0265 0.0191 -0.0020 0.0380 -0.0292 -0.0643 -0.0111 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.26) (0.13) (-0.02) (0.37) (-0.22) (-0.52) (-0.12) 
Constant -4.3673*** -4.3939*** -3.0489** -4.3093*** -4.3393*** -2.8860** -2.1777*** -2.1990*** -0.6629 
 (-4.53) (-4.32) (-2.50) (-4.51) (-4.30) (-2.37) (-2.88) (-2.78) (-0.58) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 
Adj. R2 0.0805 0.0918 0.108 0.0762 0.0861 0.0998 0.0278 0.0327 0.0426 
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Appendix C 
Difference-in-Difference Regressions: Scaled Innovation Proxies 
 
The table presents the results of difference-in-difference (DD) regressions after 
propensity score matching (PSM). Panel A presents the results of PSM. Treat is equal to 
1 for a firm-year observation experiencing a government acquisition in our sample and 
zero otherwise. We match each observation in our sample with another firm-year 
observation that is never owned by government using the method of nearest neighbor 
based on different firm characteristics. Panel B presents the results of DD regressions 
with year, country and firm fixed effects. SPatt+N is a log-transformed number of patents 
applied by a firm scaled by average number of patents applied in industry k of country i at 
year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). SCitet+N is a log-transformed number of citations received by a 
firm scaled by average number of citations received in industry k of country i at year t+N 
(N=1, 2, and 3). SCitepatt+N is a log-transformed number of citations per patent received 
by a firm scaled by average number of citations per patent received in industry k of 
country i at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). Post*Acquire is equal to one after a firm 
experiencing any government acquisition in year m (t ≥ m) and zero otherwise. All 
coefficients for year, country and firm dummies are omitted for brevity. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  SPatt+N SCitet+N SCitepatt+n 
  N=0 N=1 N=2 N=0 N=1 N=2 N=0 N=1 N=2 
Post*Acquire -0.9704** -1.0478*** -0.9524** -0.9551** -0.9725*** -0.9219** -0.9083** -0.8148*** -0.6593** 
 (-2.27) (-2.80) (-2.49) (-2.21) (-2.62) (-2.49) (-2.32) (-2.62) (-2.17) 
LnAssets 0.0910 0.3015 0.0251 0.0152 0.3172 -0.0050 -0.1206 0.3673 0.0664 
 (0.30) (0.74) (0.07) (0.04) (0.76) (-0.01) (-0.30) (1.00) (0.25) 
Tangibility 0.6437 -1.2130 -0.4924 0.4698 -1.2188 -0.6558 0.2380 -1.0017 -0.8766 
 (0.74) (-1.01) (-0.58) (0.54) (-1.01) (-0.76) (0.28) (-0.82) (-1.16) 
ROA 0.0732* 0.0691 0.2098 0.0815* 0.0758 0.2069 0.0868** 0.0665 0.1689 
 (1.81) (0.96) (0.91) (1.89) (1.05) (0.90) (2.11) (0.95) (0.82) 
Debt 0.0233 0.0021 0.0863 0.0299 0.0045 0.0869 0.0373 -0.0015 0.0687 
 (0.88) (0.06) (0.96) (0.99) (0.12) (0.97) (1.28) (-0.04) (0.87) 
Invest 0.8376 1.6048 1.4608 0.5740 1.8835 1.0599 0.2587 1.9945 0.7758 
 (0.81) (0.92) (0.64) (0.54) (1.08) (0.48) (0.27) (1.16) (0.44) 
HHI -0.4135 -0.8512** -0.2040 -0.4365 -0.7964* -0.2457 -0.6770* -0.9035** -0.5489 
 (-1.15) (-1.97) (-0.34) (-1.19) (-1.85) (-0.41) (-1.65) (-2.09) (-0.94) 
LnAge 0.0663 -0.6374 0.4072 0.1760 -0.6813 0.4095 0.2558 -0.6490 0.3738 
 (0.23) (-1.08) (0.81) (0.59) (-1.15) (0.81) (0.75) (-1.09) (0.79) 
R&D 0.5831 0.4079 -0.0425 0.3988 0.3801 0.0851 -0.5682 0.1617 0.5668 
 (0.61) (0.37) (-0.04) (0.36) (0.35) (0.08) (-0.48) (0.17) (0.68) 
Constant 2.2787 -2.0766 0.5734 3.1437 -1.8403 0.8385 4.6152 -1.6621 -0.8528 
 (0.63) (-0.69) (0.28) (0.86) (-0.64) (0.42) (1.24) (-0.63) (-0.29) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 
Adj. R2 0.631 0.477 0.453 0.600 0.466 0.449 0.432 0.368 0.389 
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Appendix D 
Dynamic Model: Scaled Innovation Proxies 
 
The table presents the results of dynamic model with year, country and firm fixed effects. 
SPatt is a log-transformed number of patents applied by a firm scaled by average number 
of patents applied in industry k of country i at year t. SCitet is a log-transformed number 
of citations received by a firm scaled by average number of citations received in industry 
k of country i at year t. SCitepatt is a log-transformed number of citations per patent 
received by a firm scaled by average number of citations per patent received in industry k 
of country i at year t. Acquire (t=n) represents n years (-3 ≤n ≤3) before or after the 
government acquisition for treatment firms. Acquire (t=0) is the event year for the 
treatment firms. All coefficients for firm characteristics variables, year, country and firm 
dummies are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  SPatt SCitet SCitepatt 
Acquire (t<=-3) -0.2161 -0.3090 -0.3415 
 (-0.63) (-1.09) (-1.09) 
Acquire (t=-2) -0.2803 -0.1657 -0.2180 
 (-0.84) (-0.47) (-0.55) 
Acquire (t=0) -1.0343** -1.0324** -1.0299** 
 (-2.01) (-2.09) (-2.20) 
Acquire (t=1) -1.1961** -1.1765** -1.1429** 
 (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.14) 
Acquire (t=2) -1.0823** -1.0669** -1.0361** 
 (-2.10) (-2.14) (-2.36) 
Acquire (t>=3) -1.2911** -1.2615** -1.2151** 
 (-2.01) (-1.98) (-2.26) 
Control YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
N 10,467 10,467 10,467 
Adj. R2 0.631 0.600 0.432 
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Chapter 2 
Leverage-Decreasing Exchange Offer and Corporate Governance: New 
Evidence 
1. Introduction 
In an exchange offer or swap, one class of securities is exchanged for another in a 
deal that involves no cash. As no cash changes hands, such an action is assumed as a pure 
case of capital structure adjustment by firms towards its optimal capital structure. 
Consequently, researchers expected a positive market reaction to both leverage-
increasing and leverage-decreasing exchange offers. However, empirical results point to 
positive market reactions only to leverage-increasing exchange offer but contrarily 
negative reactions to leverage-decreasing exchange offers. For example, Masulis (1980), 
by employing a sample of 106 leverage-increasing and 57 leverage-decreasing exchange 
offers, find  positive  announcement returns  (7.6%) for leverage-increasing exchange 
offers and  negative abnormal returns (-5.4% ) for leverage-decreasing exchange offers. 
Pinegar and Lease (1986) find a statistically significant 4.05% positive returns for 15 
leverage-increasing preferred-for-common exchange offers. The equity return for 
leverage-decreasing exchange offers is a significantly negative .73%. Copeland and Lee 
(1991) find that 61 out of 90 firms with leverage-increasing exchange offers experience 
decreases in systematic risk following the completion data and 75 out of 127 leverage-
increasing firms experience increases in systematic risk. 
This phenomenon continues to puzzle researchers who have provided several 
potential explanations and tested their implications. For example, Masulis (1980) 
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provides evidence that the negative return is because of expropriation of bondholder 
wealth, however the empirical results do not strongly support this claim when a larger 
sample is considered. Pinegar and Lease (1986) conclude that their results favor the 
signaling hypothesis over the tax hypothesis but cannot be used to reject tax hypothesis 
because it may still be relevant to the some type of exchange offer where the interest tax 
shield is affected. Copeland and Lee (1991) provide evidence that supports that the 
signaling interpretation of exchange offers.  The free cash flow theory (i.e., the negative 
market reaction to the possibility of managers misusing cash flows generated by equity 
offerings) does not apply to exchange offers as they do not bring in new cash flows.  
This essay falls in this line of research and provides an alternative explanation for 
the negative market reaction to leverage-reducing exchange offers, with respect to stocks- 
for-bonds exchange offers to be specific. Our basic premise is as follows:  the ongoing 
assumption that all exchange offers are designed to adjust a firm’s capital structure 
towards the target desired by shareholders might not be correct.  Liao, Mukherjee and 
Wang (LMW) (2015) test the idea presented by Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff (2012) 
that mangers prefer  low debt to avoid loss of control of cash flows to bondholders. LMW 
show that firms with poor corporate governance system follow their self-determined 
capital structure target that is significantly lower than the target desired by shareholders.  
This being the case, these firms attempt to lower their leverage even when they are 
underleveraged relative to the shareholders’ target. Consequently, a negative market 
reaction is likely especially if a stock-for-bond exchange sample contains a large number 
of poorly-governed firms that are making adjustments in the wrong direction.  
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We test the above hypothesis by employing the following steps; 
1. Covering a period from 1990 to 2014, we collect all firms that were involved in 
stocks-for-bonds exchange offers. The final sample consists of 143 exchange offers with 
complete information.  
2. By employing four separate models, we compute abnormal announcement 
returns for the total sample. We expect the announcement returns to be significantly 
negative (consistent with existing research).  
3. Following Liao, Mukherjee and Wang (2015), we estimate the shareholders’ 
leverage target and separate 143 exchange offers into two groups; one group with actual 
leverage lower than estimated shareholders’ target (under-leveraged) and the group with 
leverage ratio higher than estimated shareholders’ target (over-leveraged).We then 
compute the announcement returns for the two groups. Our expectations are: a) exchange 
offers by the under-levered groups will receive negative market reaction since their 
adjustments are in the wrong direction, while b) exchange offers by the over-leveraged 
group are likely to receive market reaction that is insignificantly different from zero (or 
even positive). 
4. We test to see if the under-levered group is largely (or wholly) represented by 
poorly-governed firms. 
The event study of 143 exchange offers for companies who were involved in 
stocks-for-bonds exchanges receive negative returns around the announcement dates. 
Upon dividing the total sample in two groups, we find actual leverage of the under-
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leveraged group to be almost 21 percent lower than estimated shareholders’ target and  
show that announcement returns are over 5% negative for this group  (significant at  the 
1%  level)  For the over-leveraged group on the other hand, the abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero.  In our efforts to show that under-levered firms are 
predominantly under-levered, we then compute the corporate governance index for these 
firms. Lacking the available data, we are able to compute the governance index for only 
20 of 52 firms in this group. Our results show that 18 of these 20 are poorly-governed 
firms. We are the process of collecting data from other potential sources to collect 
complete data on all firms in the sample. We will also perform further analyses on the 
firms that are over-leveraged and involved in stocks-for-bonds exchanges in order to see 
how many firms in this group are financially distressed firms.  
Our paper contributes in the following manner: First, we provide further evidence 
in support of the trade-off theory: our empirical results confirm that shareholders prefer 
firms to follow the desired optimal capital structure target (based on trade-off between the 
costs and benefits of debt); second, in further support of Liao, Mukherjee and Wang 
(2015), we demonstrate that poorly-governed firms are more likely to deliberately stay 
under-leveraged relative stockholders’ preferred target.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we present a short survey of 
the relevant literature leading to the hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 descript data, 
sample and methodology. Section 4 provides empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Testing Hypothesis 
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There are four major building blocks of corporate financing and capital structure 
theory: (1) the Modigliani–Miller theory of capital-structure irrelevance, in which firm 
values and real investment decisions are unaffected by financing; (2) the trade-off theory, 
in which firms balance the tax advantages of borrowing against the costs of financial 
distress; (3) agency theory, in which financing responds to managers’ personal 
incentives; and (4) the pecking-order theory, in which financing adapts to mitigate 
problems created by information asymmetry between managers and shareholders.  
 The modern theory of optimal capital structure starts with Modigliani and 
Miller’s (MM’s) proof (1958) that financing doesn’t matter in perfect capital markets. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) recognized the potential value of interest tax shields and 
claim that the company should borrow as much as they could. However, Miller (1977) 
argues that the tax advantages of equity could completely offset the tax-deductibility of 
interest at the corporate level. The “Miller equilibrium” shows how the tax advantages of 
corporate debt could be eroded by supply responses and shifts in investors’ portfolios. 
The trade of theory suggests that optimal capital structure occurs at a point where 
the costs of financial distress of debt is equal to the benefits of tax shield derived from the 
use of debt.  The pecking-order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) 
does not recognize the existence of an optimal capital structure but asserts that due to 
information asymmetry the firms are reluctant to raise money externally and look to their 
internal resources first, low-risk debt second, and to common equity as the last resort.  
Empirical researchers over the years have attempted to explain firms’ capital 
structure decisions. An important branch of the capital structure literature has focused on 
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the issue of the negative market reaction to leverage-decreasing adjustments by firms.  
Specifically, the researchers provide the following three explanations: tax-effect 
hypothesis, wealth transfer hypothesis and signaling hypothesis. For example, Masulis 
(1984) use a sample containing 106 leverage-increasing and 57 leverage decreasing 
exchange offers from 1962 to 1976 and find that an announcement return of 7.6 percent 
for leverage-increasing exchange offers and -5.4 percent for leverage-decreasing 
exchange offers. He concludes that the results are possibly consistent with following 
theories: (1) the tax shield benefit, discussed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) has been 
created whenever more leverage is utilized by the companies and because of those 
benefit, market reacts positively for leverage-increasing exchange offers, and/or (2) high 
leverage indicates that managers are confident about companies’ future prospects. 
Copeland and Lee (1991) provide evidence that confirms the signaling explanation 
proposed by Masulis (1984) above. ). In their sample, they find that over two-third of 
leverage-increasing companies exhibits lower system risk which implies better future 
prospects. Most importantly, important indicator of companies’ wellness such as sales, 
earnings all improved after the issuing date of leverage-increasing exchange offers. 
Similarly, Pinegar and Lease (1986) use a sample of preferred-for-equity exchange offers 
and confirm the signaling hypothesis since preferred stock usually are considered to be 
the same as debt.  
Negative market reaction to seasoned equity issuance (Masulis and Korwar 
(1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Kolodny and Suhler (1985)) has given rise to 
another explanation---the free cash flow problem implying that the money raised through 
free cash flow theory because it provides cash flows to the managers who then can use 
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the cash flows (Jansen (1986)) to better their own interests, or make investments in 
negative NPV projects. Exchanges of stocks for bonds do not bring in new cash flows 
and are not expected to send a signal—good or bad. It is still puzzling why do researchers 
find negative abnormal returns (similar to that of seasoned equity offerings) around the 
announcement of these exchange offers? In conclusion, the empirical results is somehow 
weakly consistent with tax-shield effects and wealth expropriation theory, and strongly 
consistent with signaling theory. The market interpret debt-for-equity offers as good news 
and equity-for-debt as bad news. 
On the other hand, trade-off theory provides another angel to explain why 
company adjusts theirs capital structure. There exists an optimal level of leverage in a 
typical firm and this level of leverage is the trade-off between the financial distress cost 
and tax-shield benefit. Company will adjust their leverage ratios from time to time if 
actual level of leverage is away from this optimal or target level. Most recently, Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) provides the assessments about how firms choose their capital 
structures. They present a partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firm do 
have target capital structures. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) also examine the 
persistency of corporate capital structure. However, they find that the majority of 
variation in leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that generates 
surprisingly stable capital structure.  
Our explanation for exchange offer phenomenon is originated from Morellec, 
Nikolov and Schurhoff (2012), who propose a dynamic tradeoff model and examine the 
manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure. They conclude that when making 
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financial decisions, the manager consider benefit of debt against cost of debt, including 
the cost of losing free cash flow due to the disciplining effect of debt. Therefore on 
average would tend to have a leverage target lower than shareholder’s desire level. Liao, 
Mukherjee and Wang (2015) provide the empirical evidence that the greater the severity 
of agency conflicts, the lower is the manager’s desired leverage level and the slower is 
the SOA toward the shareholder’s desired level. In contrast, managerial incentive 
compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders’ 
desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance 
on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the 
manager’s desired level and the shareholders’ desired level where the interests of 
managers and shareholders conflict. 
 
 
                                             
                                         X 
 
 
As shown in the graph, whenever a typical company’s leverage is located within 
over-levered area, it is well above both manager’s and shareholders’ target. In this case, 
there is no conflict of interest since both manager and shareholders intend to bring down 
In-between Under-levered Over-levered 
0 1 
Manager’s 
desired level 
Shareholders’ 
desired level 
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leverage. Similarly, when company’s leverage is located within under-levered regime, 
both manager and shareholders prefer to increase leverage ratio since the company does 
not fully utilize their borrowing, which is still not associated with any conflict of interest. 
However, if the company’s leverage is located within in-between regime, good-governed 
company will force manager to borrow more and move the leverage to what the 
shareholders expect. On the other hand, bad-governed company cannot efficiency 
monitor manager’s behavior so that managers tend to keep the leverage ratio low to 
benefit their personal privilege.  
Based on these rationality, the exchange offer phenomenon could be re-explained 
by following hypothesis: we are expecting poor-governed companies are mostly under-
levered regime (below shareholders’ target) so whenever there is a leverage-decreasing 
exchange offer announcement, market would react negatively since it is moving away 
from shareholders’ desired level, possibly indicating an erosion of corporate governance 
monitoring for those companies. As long as those poor-governed companies dominated in 
our sample, we would expect a negative market returns.  
Our premise can be concluded as follows: well-governed firms resort to stock-for-
bond exchange to correct the imbalances in their capital structures (i.e., these firms are 
over-leveraged firms). The market reaction to such offers by well-governed firms should 
be insignificantly different from zero (or maybe even positive). Poorly-governed firms, 
on the other hand, resort to such offers because of two reasons: 1) they are over-leveraged 
and distressed firms that are being “forced” to resort to the offers by lenders, or 2) these 
firms are taking such actions even when they are under-levered (because of their dislike 
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of debt).  If poorly-governed firms dominate in our sample, abnormal negative returns are 
the likely results.  
After calculating the shareholders’ target from Liao et al (2015), we divide the 
sample into two groups into under-leveraged companies and over-leveraged companies. 
We are testing whether the underleveraged group is dominated by poorly-governed firms 
and whether the abnormal returns for this group is negative. Then finally we divide the 
over-leveraged group into two categories: Poor governance and good governance. 
Measure abnormal returns of the two groups and we are testing whether the abnormal 
returns of the first group significantly negative while for the second group it is not. Based 
on these prediction, we construct two hypothesis as following: 
Hypothesis 1: If the company’s leverage ratio located in over-levered area, issuing 
of leverage increasing exchange offer (debt for common) would lead to a negative market 
reaction since it is deviated further from Shareholder’s target level. 
Hypothesis 2: For those companies whose leverage ratio below the shareholder’s 
target, we expect poor-governed companies are dominated. For those companies whose 
leverage ratio below the shareholder’s target, we expect good-governed companies are 
dominated. 
3. Data and Sample 
Our firm characteristic variables are obtained from COMPUSTAT and the sample 
period is from 1996 to 2014. We follow Liao et al (2015) and construct log-transformed 
of firm assets, market-to-book ratio, ROA, tangibility, depreciation, R&D expenses, 
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R&D indicator and industry median leverage, etc. as the control variables. Leverage is 
total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Firm Size is the 
total assets. Market-to-Book is book liabilities plus market value of equity divided by 
book value of assets. Profitability is operating income before depreciation divided by 
total assets. Tangibility is property, plant, and equipment as a proportion of total assets. 
Dividend Payer equals 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. R&D 
Expenses is the R&D expenses divided by sales. R&D Indicator equals 1 if firm reports 
R&D expenses, and 0 otherwise. Depreciation is the depreciation divided by total assets. 
Industry Leverage is the median market leverage ratio in each year for firms in the same 
two-digit SIC industry.  
Governance variables are obtained from RiskMetrics covering the information of 
senior managers during the period between 1996 and 2014. Institutional holding 
information is obtained from Thomson Reuters during the period of 1996 and 2014. We 
define CEO-Chairman separation, board independency, institutional holding and 
managerial delta (Morellec et al 2012) as proxies as measurement of corporate 
governance efficiency. If the companies have better corporate governance system, we 
would expect less severe manager-shareholders conflicts which implies a non-duality 
CEO, more independency board and higher institutional holding. Moreover, the 
managerial delta would be lower based on Morellec et al (2012) and Liao et al (2015). In 
our paper, Chairman Separation equals 1 if the CEO is not the chairperson of the board, 
and 0 otherwise. More independent board are considered as evidence of efficient and 
better monitor of managers. We define two variables as proxies regarding board 
independence. Outside Directors is the number of outside directors divided by total 
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number of directors on a board. More outside directors are believed to be more likely in 
behave on shareholders’ interest (Byrd and Hickman (1992)). Holdings is the number of 
institutional investor-held shares divided by total number of shares outstanding. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argue large shareholders are more likely to make tender offer, or lead 
to a proxy battle. Higher exposure to the risk motivates institutional shareholders better 
monitor self-interested managers. Managerial Delta is the sensitivity of the total value of 
stock and option holding of top five executives to a change in the stock price. Daily stock 
price returns are obtained from CRSP to conduct event study analysis.  
We collect all exchange offers regarding leverage-decreasing or leverage-
increasing capital restructuring from LexisNexis academic between 1990 and 2014. We 
find 238 leverage-decreasing and 30 leverage-increasing exchange offer. Because of no 
simultaneous change in the assets structure of the issuing firms, the pure effect of 
exchange offers allows us to isolate the effects of change in capital structure. Most 
importantly, there is no cash transaction involved in those exchange offers. In order to 
match those exchange offers with corresponding identity in COMPUSTAT, we manually 
collect each issuing company of exchange offer with GVEKY, PERMNO, and PERMCO 
in COMPUSTAT or CRSP by using WRDS company identifier. Besides, we combine 
our exchange offers with Danis (2013)1 data if there is any missing exchange offer that 
could not be found in LexisNexis. Finally we have 143 exchange offers with complete 
information from COMPUSTAT and CRSP (some companies have duplicate exchange 
offers issuance).  
 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to author for sharing the data 
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Table 10 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for leverage, governance variables, and firm 
characteristics for nonfinancial, nonutility U.S. firm-year observations in our sample 
during 1996–2008. Leverage is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market 
value of equity. Firm Size is the total assets. Market-to-Book is book liabilities plus 
market value of equity divided by book value of assets. Profitability is operating income 
before depreciation divided by total assets. Tangibility is property, plant, and equipment 
as a proportion of total assets. Dividend Payer equals 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. R&D Expenses is the R&D expenses divided by sales. R&D 
Indicator equals 1 if firm reports R&D expenses, and 0 otherwise. Depreciation is the 
amount of deprecation divided by total assets. Industry Leverage is the median market 
leverage ratio in each year for firms in the same two-digit SIC industry. CEO-Chairman 
Separation equals 1 if the CEO is not the chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Holdings is the number of institutional investor-held shares divided by total number of 
shares outstanding. Outside Directors is the number of outside directors divided by total 
number of directors on a board. Managerial Delta is the sensitivity of the total value of 
stock and option holding of top five executives to a change in the stock price. Panel B 
provides the summary statistics for the companies who issues leverage-increasing 
exchange offers. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Full Sample 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Leverage 0.1904 0.1441 0.1874 0 0.9844 
Firm Size (in million) 7.2854 7.1350 1.4483 2.9866 13.3542 
Market-to-Book 1.8543 1.3893 1.4603 0.0425 9.4784 
Profitability 0.1499 0.1459 0.1027 -1.3192 0.9651 
Tangibility 0.2852 0.2278 0.2119 0.0023 0.9662 
Dividend Payer 0.5434 1 0.4981 0 1 
R&D Expense 0.0332 0.0056 0.0559 0 0.9379 
R&D Indicator 0.6596 1 0.4739 0 1 
Depreciation 0.0461 0.0405 0.0345 0.0009 1.1925 
Industry Leverage 0.1420 0.1104 0.1285 0 0.9474 
CEO-Chairman Separation 0.4408 0 0.4965 0 1 
Holdings 0.7361 0.7654 0.1935 0 0.9997 
Outside Directors 0.6755 0.7 0.1679 0 0.9167 
Managerial Delta 6.4222 6.4438 1.4666 0 13.7473 
 
 
61 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Companies Issuing Exchange Offers 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Leverage 0.4680 0.4469 0.2412 0.0178 0.9749 
Firm Size (in million) 8.1215 7.7734 1.7631 5.0067 12.7072 
Market-to-Book 1.0233 0.8870 0.5282 0.3679 5.0257 
Profitability 0.1095 0.1155 0.0856 -0.3138 0.3014 
Tangibility 0.2772 0.2310 0.2114 0.0065 0.7396 
Dividend Payer 0.5846 1 0.4947 0 1 
R&D Expense 0.0223 0.0075 0.0394 0 0.2789 
R&D Indicator 0.5846 1 0.4947 0 1 
Depreciation 0.0436 0.0398 0.0252 0.0023 0.1355 
Industry Leverage 0.1817 0.1571 0.1496 0.0024 0.6447 
CEO-Chairman 
Separation 
0.4370 0 0.4981 0 1 
Holdings 0.7092 0.7284 0.2265 0.0514 0.9991 
Outside Directors 0.7111 0.7273 0.1575 0.2857 0.9091 
Managerial Delta 5.5841 5.7838 1.5417 0.8194 8.7887 
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Table 1 provides the summary statistics of all variables in our sample from 1996-
2006, which is the sample period that is used to estimate the shareholders’ target leverage 
ratio. The company in our sample has an asset of 7.3 million on average. The mean 
leverage ratio is 19 percent, with a book-to-market ratio of 1.8 and profitability of 15 
percent. There are 28 percent of the assets are tangible, and over 54 percent of our sample 
firms are dividend payers. A typical company spends over 3 percent of total sales on 
research and development, over 65 percent of our sample firms report a R&D expenses 
with an annual depreciation over 4 percent of total assets. On the other hand, over 44 
percent of our sample firms have non-dual directorship with over 67 percent of directors 
with independent affiliations. The mean managerial delta is 6.42.  
Panel B of table 1 provides the summary statistics for 141 firms issuing exchange 
offers. The mean leverage ratio of those treatment firms is much higher than a typical 
firm in the full sample, which is about 46.8 percent. However, the other firm 
characteristics are somehow similar to a typical in our full sample. Moreover, corporate 
governance variables are also similar, indicating that a treatment firm is not 
systematically different from a sample firm. 
4. Testing Methodology and Empirical Results.  
4. I Event Study of All Leverage-Decreasing Exchange Offers 
To test our hypothesis, we follow previous literatures and conduct an event study 
to show the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date for those 
exchange offers. The entire event period is [-256, 10]. Estimation period is [-245, -10]. 
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We calculate the CAR within the event window [-1, 1] and test the significance of the 
CAR based on the standard errors of cumulative returns for all exchange offers. We 
define four different ways to calculate the abnormal return; market model, adjusted 
market model, Fama-French 3-factor model and 4 factor model with momentum.  The 
market model is the simple abnormal return which is calculated by subtracting individual 
stock return from S&P 500 value-weighted market return. Adjusted market model 
calculates the abnormal return by regressing individual stock returns on S&P 500 value-
weighted market returns. 3-factor and 4-factor model calculate the abnormal returns by 
regression excess individual stock return on HML, SMB and excess market 
returns/momentum. HML, SMB and excess market returns are obtained from Kenneth 
French’s website and momentum variable is from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  
Table 2 provides the cumulative abnormal returns for all 145 leverage-decreasing 
exchange offers in our sample. Figure 1 provides the abnormal return and cumulative 
abnormal returns within the event window of [-10. 10]. Our finding is consistent all 
previous finding. There is negative cumulative abnormal returns round the window [-1, 1] 
no matter what specification of model is used and the negative effect is significant at 10 
percent level. 4-factor model provides the most negative return in magnitude. From the 
figure we can clearly find that a dramatically drop of cumulative abnormal return round 
the announcement date, especially for the 4-factor model with momentum.  
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Table 11 
Event Study of Leverage-Decreasing Exchange Offers 
 
This table presents the results of event study for 143 companies exchanging debt for 
common equity. Panel A presents the abnormal return (AR) from ten days before 
announcement of exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange offers. 
Estimation window used to calculate the abnormal returns is between [-245, 10]. Market 
abnormal returns is calculated as difference between daily stock returns and value-
weighted S&P 500 market returns. Adjusted market return is the abnormal return 
calculated from the regressing daily stock returns on excess value-weighted market 
returns. 3-Factors return is the abnormal return calculated from Fama-French 3-factor 
model. 4-Factors return is the abnormal return calculated from 4-factor model including 
momentum. Panel B presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from ten days 
before announcement of exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange 
offers and the CAR for event window between [-3, -1], [-1, 1] and [1, 3]. Numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0136 -0.0120 -0.0127 -0.0128 
-7 0.0152 0.0128 0.0117 0.0101 
-6 0.0202 0.0203 0.0215 0.0192 
-5 -0.0058 -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0036 
-4 -0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0067 -0.0069 
-3 -0.0117 -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0104 
-2 0.0124 0.0085 0.0096 0.0109 
-1 -0.0174 -0.0185 -0.0205 -0.0221 
0 -0.0070 -0.0088 -0.0104 -0.0105 
1 0.0030 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0009 
2 0.0002 -0.0032 -0.0060 -0.0046 
3 0.0048 0.0034 0.0018 0.0015 
4 0.0066 0.0058 0.0060 0.0058 
5 -0.0028 -0.0065 -0.0094 -0.0093 
6 0.0070 0.0039 0.0052 0.0049 
7 -0.0047 -0.0073 -0.0098 -0.0100 
8 -0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0049 -0.0057 
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Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0203 -0.0232 -0.0252 -0.0262 
-7 -0.0051 -0.0103 -0.0135 -0.0161 
-6 0.0151 0.0100 0.0080 0.0031 
-5 0.0093 0.0063 0.0038 -0.0006 
-4 0.0074 0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0075 
-3 -0.0043 -0.0092 -0.0129 -0.0179 
-2 0.0081 -0.0007 -0.0033 -0.0070 
-1 -0.0093 -0.0192 -0.0238 -0.0291 
0 -0.0163 -0.0281 -0.0342 -0.0396 
1 -0.0133 -0.0295 -0.0358 -0.0388 
2 -0.0131 -0.0327 -0.0418 -0.0434 
3 -0.0083 -0.0293 -0.0401 -0.0419 
4 -0.0017 -0.0235 -0.0341 -0.0360 
5 -0.0046 -0.0299 -0.0435 -0.0453 
6 0.0024 -0.0261 -0.0384 -0.0404 
7 -0.0023 -0.0334 -0.0482 -0.0504 
8 -0.0040 -0.0367 -0.0530 -0.0561 
CAR[-3, -1] 
 -0.0177 -0.0231 -0.0220 -0.0228 
 (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0192) 
CAR[-1, 1] 
 -0.0239 -0.0321 -0.0360* -0.0352 
 (0.0211) (0.0216) (0.0224) (0.0225) 
CAR[1, 3] 
 0.0095 -0.0006 -0.0049 -0.0014 
  (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0147) (0.0145) 
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Figure 2. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Equity for Debt 
Exchange Offers 
This graph reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) between the event window [-
10, 10], which is calculated from Market model, Adjusted Market model, FF 3-Factors 
model and 4-Factors model with momentum. 
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The event study of all leverage-decreasing exchange offers in our sample 
indicates the negative market reaction around the announcement date. Our results confirm 
the previous finding that are originally detected by Masulis (1984) and Copeland and Lee 
(1991). 
4. II Estimation of Shareholders’ Target Leverage Ratio 
We follow the Liao et al (2015) to estimate the shareholders’ target leverage by 
using Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation. We measure capital structure by using 
market debt-to-capital ratio which could be expressed as: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡
 
Where FDit is the financial debt of firm i at year t, that is, the sum of long term 
debt and current liability; Sit is the number of common share outstanding; and Pit is the 
stock price of firm i at year t.  
The conventional partial adjustment model for leverage evolution is as below: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜆(𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗  is target leverage ratio and 𝜆 captures speed of adjustment. We estimate 
the target leverage with 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1. Our model would become: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Xi,t-1 represent a set of firm characteristics, time and firm fixed effect, the median 
leverage for two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Given actual corporate 
governance quality, the predicted target from 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 captures managers’ desired 
target. We assume perfect corporate governance quality takes 99th percentile value of 
corporate governance variables. This predicted ratio would serve as our estimate of the 
shareholders’ desired leverage level. 
Table 3 presents the results of GMM estimation. The entire sample includes 
10,577 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2008 consisting 1634 unique companies. 
Specification one is result of conventional partial adjustment model without the corporate 
governance variables. Lagging leverage ratio is positively significant at 1 percent level 
indicating an adjustment speed of 0.315, which is similar to finding of Liao et al (2015). 
Moreover, Firm size, Market-to-book ratio, Profitability, R&D Expenses and Industry 
Leverage ratio are also significant at 1 percent level and sign of coefficients are also as 
expected. Frank and Goyal (2009) define those variables as the most important variables 
for capital structure research.  
Specification two of table 3 presents the result of conventional partial adjustment 
model after including all four corporate governance variables; The Morellec, Nikolov and 
Schurhoff (2012) predict that a self-interested manager tends to use leverage lower than 
optimal 
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Table 12 
Corporate Governance and Leverage 
 
This table presents the estimation results for partial adjustment model as following: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is leverage ratio of a typical firm, Xi,t-1 represent a set of firm characteristics, 
time and firm fixed effect, the median leverage for two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). Specification (1) only includes firm characteristics such as firm size, 
market-bo-book ratio, profitability, depreciation, tangibility, R&D expense, dividend 
payer indicator, R&D indicator and industry leverage ratio with year and firm fixed 
effect. Specification (2) includes additional corporate governance variables such as CEO-
director separation, outside directors, institutional holdings and managerial delta. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Lag Leverage 0.6852*** 0.7238*** 
 (0.037) (0.030) 
Firm Size 0.0077*** 0.0080 
 (0.001) (0.005) 
Market-to-Book -0.0087*** 0.0033 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.0812*** -0.1710*** 
 (0.018) (0.040) 
Depreciation 0.0315 -0.0742 
 (0.060) (0.109) 
Tangibility 0.0187** -0.0320 
 (0.009) (0.031) 
R&D Expense -0.1236*** -0.2712*** 
 (0.026) (0.080) 
Dividend Payer -0.0032 0.0072 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
R&D Indicator -0.0059* -0.0021 
 (0.003) (0.015) 
Industry leverage 0.1044*** 0.1248*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) 
CEO-Director Separation  0.0040 
  (0.004) 
Outside Directors  -0.0136 
  (0.019) 
Holdings  0.1145*** 
  (0.032) 
Managerial Delta  -0.0099* 
    (0.006) 
N 10,557 10,187 
Number of Firms 1,634 1,597 
Year FE YES YES 
Robusted SE YES YES 
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The presence of efficient corporate governance would alleviate this problem. We 
expect the CEO-Director Separation, Independent Directors and Holdings to be 
positively related to leverage ratio. On the other hand, the Managerial Delta would be 
negatively related to the leverage. The second column of table 3 confirms our 
expectation. After adding corporate governance variable into our model, 𝜆 decreases to 
0.277 indicating a lower speed of adjustment. Coefficients of CEO-Director Separation 
and Holdings are positive and Holdings is significant at 1 percent level. However, the 
sign of Outside Director is not as expected, which is negative 0.014 and not significant. 
Only Profitability, R&D Expense and Industry Leverage still remain significant in the 
second specification.  
Based on the coefficients estimated in our conventional partial adjustment model, 
we calculate the shareholder’s target leverage and divide all sample firms into two group; 
underleveraged firms and overleveraged firms. The 99th percentile value for CEO-
Director Separation, Holding, Outside Directors and Managerial Delta are 1, 0.99, 
0.91667 and 3.1107 respectively. However, we end up with 90 companies with non-
missing financial information from COMPUSTAT which is needed for calculating 
shareholder’s target, at the year when those companies issued exchange offers. There are 
38 companies issuing exchange offers with an actual leverage ratio lower than 
shareholders’ target and 52 companies with an actual leverage ratio higher than 
shareholders’ target.  
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Table 13 
Shareholders’ Leverage Targets 
 
This table provides the summary statistics of actual leverage ratio and shareholders’ 
target leverage ratio for under-levered companies and over-levered companies. There are 
52 under-levered companies and 38 over-levered companies.  
 
  Mean Median Std Dev 1st Pctl 
99th 
Pctl 
Actual Leverage Level      
All Companies 0.5677 0.6192 0.3171 0 0.9987 
Below the Target 0.4419 0.4531 0.2826 0 0.8715 
Above the Target 0.7565 0.8686 0.2716 0.0841 0.9987 
Estimated Shareholders' Targets      
All Companies 0.6390 0.7195 0.2506 0 0.9375 
Below the Target 0.6580 0.6966 0.2274 0.1659 0.9375 
Above the Target 0.6104 0.7383 0.2831 0 0.9358 
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Table 4 provides the results of actual leverage ratio and shareholders’ target for all 
90 companies. The mean actual leverage for all companies is 0.568. For those who have 
an actual leverage lower than shareholders’ target, the mean actual leverage is 0.442 
which is about 20 percent below the target. On the other hand, for those who have an 
actual leverage higher than shareholders’ target, the mean actual leverage is 0.757 which 
is about 14 percent higher than target.  
4. III Event Study for Sub-Sample 
We then conduct event study analysis for these two sub groups based on whether 
companies leverage are below or above the shareholders’ target. We still use market 
model, adjusted market model, FF 3-factor model and 4-factor model to calculate the 
abnormal returns. Estimation window is [-245, -10]. Event window is [-10, 10]. Table 5 
and 6 provide the results of event study.  
Based on our hypothesis, the companies with leverage ratio lower than target still 
issue a leverage-decreasing exchange offer, signaling a possible erosion of corporate 
governance. In table 5, we find that there are significant negative CAR around the 
announcement date [-1, 1] no matter what model is used to calculate the abnormal return. 
All CAR are significant at 1 percent level indicating a strong market reaction. Moreover, 
the negative return is over 5 percent for all specifications. From figure 1, we clearly find 
a dramatically drop of CAR around the event window [-2, 2].  
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Table 14 
Abnormal Returns for Under-Levered Companies  
 
This table presents the results of event study for 58 companies exchanging debt for 
common equity where actual leverage ratios are lower than estimated shareholders’ 
target. Panel A presents the abnormal return (AR) from ten days before announcement of 
exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange offers. Estimation 
window used to calculate the abnormal returns is between [-245, 10]. Market abnormal 
returns is calculated as difference between daily stock returns and value-weighted S&P 
500 market returns. Adjusted market return is the abnormal return calculated from the 
regressing daily stock returns on excess value-weighted market returns. 3-Factors return 
is the abnormal return calculated from Fama-French 3-factor model. 4-Factors return is 
the abnormal return calculated from 4-factor model including momentum. Panel B 
presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from ten days before announcement of 
exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange offers and the CAR for 
event window between [-3, -1], [-1, 1] and [1, 3]. Numbers in parenthesis are standard 
errors and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0145 -0.0167 -0.0174 -0.0157 
-7 0.0446 0.0401 0.0364 0.0354 
-6 0.0365 0.0349 0.0342 0.0326 
-5 0.0089 0.0098 0.0100 0.0117 
-4 -0.0111 -0.0150 -0.0192 -0.0190 
-3 -0.0168 -0.0180 -0.0162 -0.0143 
-2 -0.0134 -0.0189 -0.0185 -0.0179 
-1 -0.0177 -0.0196 -0.0225 -0.0256 
0 -0.0209 -0.0204 -0.0219 -0.0211 
1 -0.0097 -0.0153 -0.0181 -0.0156 
2 -0.0003 -0.0078 -0.0130 -0.0124 
3 0.0310 0.0281 0.0268 0.0266 
4 0.0263 0.0246 0.0212 0.0205 
5 -0.0057 -0.0135 -0.0180 -0.0174 
6 -0.0074 -0.0120 -0.0138 -0.0116 
7 0.0066 0.0017 -0.0032 -0.0011 
8 -0.0010 -0.0072 -0.0105 -0.0080 
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Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0091 -0.0229 -0.0248 -0.0238 
-7 0.0355 0.0173 0.0116 0.0116 
-6 0.0719 0.0522 0.0458 0.0442 
-5 0.0809 0.0620 0.0558 0.0559 
-4 0.0697 0.0470 0.0366 0.0369 
-3 0.0529 0.0290 0.0204 0.0226 
-2 0.0395 0.0101 0.0019 0.0047 
-1 0.0218 -0.0095 -0.0206 -0.0208 
0 0.0009 -0.0299 -0.0425 -0.0420 
1 -0.0088 -0.0452 -0.0607 -0.0575 
2 -0.0091 -0.0530 -0.0737 -0.0700 
3 0.0218 -0.0249 -0.0468 -0.0433 
4 0.0481 -0.0003 -0.0256 -0.0228 
5 0.0424 -0.0138 -0.0436 -0.0402 
6 0.0351 -0.0258 -0.0575 -0.0517 
7 0.0417 -0.0240 -0.0607 -0.0528 
8 0.0407 -0.0313 -0.0712 -0.0608 
CAR[-3, -1] 
 -0.0517*** -0.0608*** -0.0614*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0213) (0.0203) (0.0202) 
CAR[-1, 1] 
  -0.0526*** -0.0601*** -0.0678*** -0.0676*** 
  (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0274) (0.0278) 
CAR[1, 3] 
 0.0243 0.0069 -0.0024 0.0005 
  (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
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Figure 3. Abnormal Returns for Companies Where Leverage Lower than 
Shareholders’ Targets 
This graph reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for under-levered firms 
between the event window [-10, 10], which is calculated from Market model, Adjusted 
Market model, FF 3-Factors model and 4-Factors model with momentum. 
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The results clearly show the evidence that market react negatively to companies who 
issued a leverage-decreasing exchange offer when they do not fully utilize the debt. 
Managers might retire more debt to benefit personal privilege and somehow corporate 
board could not efficiently monitor this behavior. 
On the other hand, table 6 provides the results for the companies with an actual 
leverage ratio lower than the targets. The CAR around the announcement date for this 
group is also negative, however not significant at any confidence level. The negative 
returns are all lower than 2.2 percent. Compared with the other group, the magnitude and 
significance of negative return are much weaker. From figure 3, we do not find obvious 
decline of CAR around the announcement date. Actually the CAR is positive on date +1, 
indicating a non-negative reaction from the market. 
The sub-sample event study analysis provides the evidence that market reacts 
negatively to a leverage-decreasing exchange offer is mostly because of a worry of 
possible eroding corporate governance system. Since the group with leverage lower than 
targets dominates our sample, which shows a much stronger negative CAR compared 
with the other group. We could reach out the conclusion that the results confirm our 
prediction and hypothesis.  
4. IV Poor and Good Governed Firms 
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Table 15 
Abnormal Returns for Over-Levered Companies  
 
This table presents the results of event study for 32 companies exchanging debt for 
common equity where actual leverage ratios are higher than estimated shareholders’ 
target. Panel A presents the abnormal return (AR) from ten days before announcement of 
exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange offers. Estimation 
window used to calculate the abnormal returns is between [-245, 10]. Market abnormal 
returns is calculated as difference between daily stock returns and value-weighted S&P 
500 market returns. Adjusted market return is the abnormal return calculated from the 
regressing daily stock returns on excess value-weighted market returns. 3-Factors return 
is the abnormal return calculated from Fama-French 3-factor model. 4-Factors return is 
the abnormal return calculated from 4-factor model including momentum. Panel B 
presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from ten days before announcement of 
exchange offers to ten days after the announcement of exchange offers and the CAR for 
event window between [-3, -1], [-1, 1] and [1, 3]. Numbers in parenthesis are standard 
errors and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0225 -0.0177 -0.0225 -0.0248 
-7 -0.0110 -0.0140 -0.0147 -0.0150 
-6 0.0441 0.0480 0.0508 0.0478 
-5 -0.0370 -0.0367 -0.0369 -0.0367 
-4 0.0093 0.0094 0.0031 0.0035 
-3 0.0061 0.0056 0.0062 0.0036 
-2 0.0619 0.0554 0.0563 0.0573 
-1 -0.0205 -0.0239 -0.0258 -0.0262 
0 -0.0111 -0.0168 -0.0200 -0.0212 
1 0.0264 0.0220 0.0251 0.0285 
2 0.0060 0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0060 
3 -0.0308 -0.0319 -0.0327 -0.0356 
4 -0.0119 -0.0133 -0.0144 -0.0163 
5 0.0075 0.0063 0.0020 0.0004 
6 0.0430 0.0416 0.0450 0.0423 
7 -0.0204 -0.0211 -0.0267 -0.0272 
8 0.0126 0.0132 0.0131 0.0068 
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Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Window Market Adjusted 3-Factors 4-Factors 
-8 -0.0663 -0.0177 -0.0469 -0.0538 
-7 -0.0657 -0.0140 -0.0616 -0.0689 
-6 0.0335 0.0480 -0.0108 -0.0211 
-5 -0.0846 -0.0367 -0.0477 -0.0577 
-4 -0.0291 0.0094 -0.0446 -0.0543 
-3 -0.0262 0.0056 -0.0384 -0.0507 
-2 0.0915 0.0554 0.0179 0.0066 
-1 -0.0114 -0.0239 -0.0080 -0.0196 
0 -0.0111 -0.0168 -0.0279 -0.0408 
1 0.0264 0.0220 -0.0028 -0.0123 
2 0.0060 0.0010 -0.0074 -0.0183 
3 -0.0308 -0.0319 -0.0401 -0.0538 
4 -0.0119 -0.0133 -0.0545 -0.0701 
5 0.0075 0.0063 -0.0525 -0.0698 
6 0.0430 0.0416 -0.0075 -0.0275 
7 -0.0204 -0.0211 -0.0343 -0.0546 
8 0.0126 0.0132 -0.0211 -0.0478 
CAR[-3, -1] 
 0.0499 0.0394 0.0389 0.0369 
  (0.0343) (0.0337) (0.0326) (0.0318) 
CAR[-1, 1] 
 -0.0054 -0.0194 -0.0214 -0.0196 
  (0.0252) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0265) 
CAR[1, 3] 
 0.0017 -0.0092 -0.0126 -0.0135 
  (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0315) (0.0310) 
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Figure 4. Abnormal Returns for Companies Where Leverage Higher than 
Shareholders’ Targets 
This graph reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for over-levered firms 
between the event window [-10, 10], which is calculated from Market model, Adjusted 
Market model, FF 3-Factors model and 4-Factors model with momentum. 
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In this section, we investigate how many under-levered or over-levered companies 
are actually poor governed. We construct an aggregate governance quality variable, 
which is the weighted average of all four corporate governance variables specified in the 
previous section. We construct this aggregate variable based on PCA. PCA gives a 
comprehensive all-in-one variable as well as removing multi-collinearity among four 
individual corporate governance variables. The factor loadings for CEO-Director 
separation, outside directors, holdings and Managerial Delta are 0.329, 0.493, 0.54 and -
0.275, respectively. Based on these factor loadings, the median aggregate governance 
qualify is 0.095. 
Table 7 presents the summary statistics of aggregate governance qualify for 
under-lever and over-levered companies. Due to the missing value in individual corporate 
governance variables, we are unable to calculate the aggregate governance qualify for all 
firms: only 20 out of 52 under-levered firms and 8 out 38 over-levered firms have all 
complete information of individual corporate governance variables. Based on the 
information we retrieve, 18 out of 20 under-levered firms have an aggregate governance 
value below than sample median. On the other hand, 4 out of 8 over-levered firms have 
an aggregate governance value below than sample median. The mean aggregate 
governance qualify for under-levered firms is way below the sample mean, which is at -
0.515, an almost 35 percent lower than mean aggregate qualify of over-levered firms. 
However, this result potentially indicates that under-levered firms are dominated by poor-
governed firms, which is over 90 percent of entire under-levered firms.  
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Table 16 
Aggregate Governance Qualify 
 
Table 7 presents the summary statistics of aggregate governance qualify for under-lever 
and over-levered companies. The factor loadings for CEO-Director separation, outside 
directors, holdings and Managerial Delta are 0.329, 0.493, 0.54 and -0.275, respectively. 
Due to the missing value in individual corporate governance variables, we are unable to 
calculate the aggregate governance qualify for all firms: only 20 out of 52 under-levered 
firms and 8 out 38 over-levered firms have all complete information of individual 
corporate governance variables. 
 
  Aggregate Below Median Above Median Not Sure 
Below Shareholders' Target -0.5149 18 2 32 
Above Shareholders' Target -0.0760 4 4 30 
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we find actual leverage is almost 21 percent lower than estimated 
shareholders’ target for the under-lever group. Most importantly, we particularly find that 
negative announcement returns are driven by the group with leverage level lower than 
target: a negative return over 5 percent at 1 percent significance no matter what 
specifications of calculations of abnormal returns are used. On the other hand, for the 
group with leverage lever higher than target, the event study analysis indicates there is no 
significant negative return associated in this group, indicating a possible eroding of 
corporate governance monitor system for those companies. Subsample event study 
confirms our prediction that the negative market reaction of an equity for debt exchange 
offer reflects worsen corporate governance since those companies do not behave on 
shareholders’ interest. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definition 
 
Variable Description 
Leverage 
Book debt ratio: total debts divided by total assets. Total 
debts=COUPUSTAT item ([9]+[34]). 
Firm Size Log transform of firm total assets. Assets are COMPUSTAT item [AT]. 
Profitability 
Returns on Asset: net income divided by book value of total assets. Net 
income is COMPUSTAT item [172]. 
MB 
Market to book ratio: Market equity value divided by book value of total 
assets. Market value of equity =COMPUSTAT item 
([9]+[34]+[10]+[199]*[25]). 
Tangibility 
Tangible assets as a proportion of total assets: Common equity divided by 
total assets. Common equity is COMPUSTAT item [11]. 
Depreciation  The amount of deprecation divided by total assets 
R&D/Assets 
R&D expenses divided by total assets. R&D expenses is COMPUSTAT 
item [46]. 
R&D Indicator  Equals 1 if firm reports R&D expenses, and 0 otherwise. 
Dividend Payer  Equals 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Industry Leverage  
Median market leverage ratio in each year for firms in the same two-digit 
SIC industry 
CEO-Chairman 
Separation 
Equals 1 if the CEO is not the chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise.  
Holdings 
The number of institutional investor-held shares divided by total number 
of shares outstanding. 
Outside Directors 
Number of outside directors divided by total number of directors on a 
board 
Managerial Delta 
Sensitivity of the total value of stock and option holding of top five 
executives to a change in the stock price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Vita 
 
Zhengyi Zhang was born in Xiamen, P.R. China. He obtained his B.S. in Finance from 
Jimei University, China in 2006. He also earned his M.S. in Mathematical Finance from 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte in 2012. He joined the University of New 
Orleans to pursue the Ph.D in Financial Economics in 2012. His research interest includes 
corporate governance, capital structure, and corporate innovation. 
 
